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I. INTRODUCTION
Employees routinely sign confidentiality agreements,
promising not to disclose employer confidential information. The
ostensible purpose of a confidentiality agreement is to prevent
unfair competition from the employer's competitors. The
employer may have legitimately relied on a confidentiality
agreement to safeguard its market share. Often the employer has
t Carol M. Bast is an associate professor of legal studies in the Department
of Criminal Justice and Legal Studies at the University of Central Florida.
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expended significant time and money in developing the
information; however, the nature of confidential information is
that once the information is leaked, confidentiality is forever lost.
By the same token, an umbrella confidentiality agreement may
very well safeguard information crucial to public health or safety.
The silence of the employee is bought without review of the
agreement by a neutral third party.' A confidentiality agreement
purporting to cover public health or safety risks or illegal acts may
satisfy the employer's needs, but not the needs of the employee nor
the needs of society. To whom does the employee/citizen owe
allegiance in that situation? When is the employee's and society's
interest in revealing information superior to the employer's
interest in confidentiality? Should the employee blow the whistle
or remain silent?
Jeffrey Wigand ("Wigand") served as Brown and Williamson
Tobacco Corporation's ("B&W") vice president for research and
development from January 1989 until March 24, 1993, when B&W
fired him.' From 1994 to 1996, Wigand blew the whistle on B&W,
a
thereby allegedly violating a number of confidentiality agreements
he had with B&W.
5
The decision that Wigand made to blow the whistle on B&W
could have far-reaching consequences. Wigand was the highest
ranking tobacco executive to blow the whistle on the tobacco
industry, and his former status with B&W lent credibility to his
1. See Barbara Carton & Ross Kerber, EEOC Battles Pacts That Buy Worker
Silence, WALL ST.J.,June 13, 1996, at BI. A confidentiality agreement is sometimes
nicknamed a "golden gag." See id.
2. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Wigand, 913 F. Supp. 530, 531
(W.D. Ky. 1996). Brown & Williamson ("B&W'), the third largest United States
tobacco company, is owned by BAT Industries (formerly known as "British
American Tobacco"), a worldwide conglomerate with a number of tobacco
subsidiaries. See Marie Brenner, The Man Who Knew Too Much, VANrY FAIR, May
1996, at 171, 176-77.
3. See 60 Minutes-Profile: Jeffrey Wigand, Ph.D.; Jeffrey Wigand Discloses
Information on Brown & Williamson and Attempts are Made to Rebut the Claims (CBS
television broadcast, Feb. 4, 1996), available in 1996 WL 8064777. Wigand did not
find another job until he began teaching in a public high school in Louisville,
Kentucky in January 1995 at $30,000 annually. See id.
4. See Alix M. Freedman & Suein L. Hwang, Leaders of the Pact: How Seven
Individuals with Diverse Motives Halted Tobacco's Wars; One Tailored the Lawsuits,
Another Woke the FDA; Dick Morris Came to Play, WALL ST. J., July 11, 1997, at Al.
5. See infra notes 400-02 and accompanying text.
6. See Chip Jones & Peter Hardin, His Public Stand Has Private Consequences,
RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Mar. 31, 1996, at Al. Other lesser-ranking former
tobacco company employees have also come forward. See id. These whistle
[Vol. 25
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disclosures.7 He used his expertise to analyze leaked documents
blowers include Dr. Ian L. Uydess, former research scientist and associate senior
scientist, Dr. William A. Farone, former director of applied research, Jerome
Rivers, former plant shift supervisor, and Dr. Victor DeNoble, a behavioral
psychologist, all formerly from Philip Morris. See id.
Merrell Williams, a former paralegal who worked at a law firm
representing B&W previously leaked numerous B&W documents. See id. On May
12, 1994, University of California at San Francisco Professor of Medicine Stanton
Glantz received a Federal Express package containing 4,000 pages of confidential
B&W documents from "Mr. Butts." See Sheryl Stolberg, Tobacco Tactics-How an
Anti-Tobacco Activist Became a Target-The Saga of Stan Glantz is Emblematic of How
Tobacco Giants Try to Squelch Their Opponents, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul),
Apr. 16, 1996, at 9A. Glantz delivered the papers to the tobacco archive of the
UCSF library. See id. On February 3, 1995, the UCSF librarian received a letter
from a B&W attorney requesting the return of the papers. See id. B&W posted
individuals outside the tobacco archive "to keep watch on our papers because our
view was the documents were stolen and we didn't want them disappearing from
the library the same way they disappeared from our building." Id. B&W filed suit
against the university requesting the return of the papers and requesting the
names of persons who had viewed them. See id. The documents began to be
posted on the Internet on July 1, 1995 after the California Supreme Court ruled
that they should be open to the public. SeeJoe Ward, Internet Users Getting a Look
at B&W's Papers, COURIER-J. (Louisville),July 6, 1995, at 8B.
B&W believes the documents Glantz received came directly or indirectly
from Williams. See Greg Otolski, Papers in B&W Flap Available in California,
COURIER-J. (Louisville), Feb. 8, 1995, at 8B. Williams made copies of B&W
documents and provided the copies to Richard Scruggs in April 1994. See Andrew
Wolfson, Judge Will Try to Clear Smoke Surrounding Stolen Legal Papers, COURIER-J.
(Louisville), Dec. 1, 1993, at IA. Scruggs, special counsel to the state of
Mississippi in its lawsuit against the tobacco companies, and Mississippi Attorney
General Mike Moore provided the documents to Representative Henry Waxman.
See Chris Burritt &Jim Yardley, Around the South: Tobacco Company Attacks Ethics of 2
Whistleblowers, ATLANTAJ. & CONST., May 1, 1996, at Cl. In April 1994, Waxman
chaired the House of Representatives Health and Environment Subcommittee
that held hearings on the tobacco industry. See Mike Brown, Companies "Lied"
About Nicotine, Lawmaker Says; Cigarette Firms Identify Additives, COURIER-J.
(Louisville), Apr. 14, 1994, at IA. Waxman claimed that cigarettes are drugs
which should be regulated by the FDA. See id.
7. See Greg Otolski, Teacher at Manual Called "Explosive" Anti-Tobacco Witness,
COURIER-J. (Louisville), Nov. 18, 1995, at IA. Richard Daynard, a Northeastern
University professor of law who heads of The Tobacco Products Liability Project,
commented:
Jeff Wigand is different from other witnesses in past tobacco cases,
because he is highly respected, he worked directly on sensitive projects,
his memory is recent and the work was done in the United States....
The only thing I can compare this to is the first time high-ranking
members in the Mafia came out and testified against the mob.
Id. A Vanity Fair article opined, "Wigand is the most sophisticated source who has
ever come forward from the tobacco industry, a fact which has motivated B&W to
mount a multi-million-dollar campaign to destroy him." Brenner, supra note 2, at
1999]
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and to educate 60 Minutes, ABC News, and the Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA"). 8 Some believe that his disclosures served
as a catalyst to mobilize anti-tobacco forces and hasten legal liability
for the tobacco industry.9
174.
8. See Brenner, supra note 2, at 179-81. In early spring 1993, someone had
left a crate of Philip Morris internal documents on Lowell Bergman's doorstep.
See id. Bergman, 60 Minutes producer, asked Wigand to analyze the leaked
documents, and 60 Minutes paid Wigand $12,000 for his work. See 60 Minutes,
supra note 3. Wigand also advised the Food & Drug Administration ("FDA") on
cigarette chemistry and reportedly advised David Kessler, former head of the
FDA, about "ammonia additives and nicotine-boosting." Id. Further, Wigand
advised ABC News attorneys defending a ten billion dollar lawsuit brought by
Philip Morris. See Brenner, supra note 2, at 206. Philip Morris has sued ABC News
for a Day One story that charged the tobacco companies "spiked" cigarettes with
nicotine to keep smokers hooked. See Elizabeth Jensen & Eben Shapiro, Philip
Morris Suit Against ABC News Seeks $10 Billion, Alleges Defamation, WALL ST. J., Mar.
25, 1994, at B12; see also Day One (ABC television broadcast, Feb. 28 & Mar. 7,
1994). He has also testified before three federal grand juries. See Henry
Weinstein, Tobacco Whistle-blower's Star is Rising Award: An Industry Drive to Discredit
Him and a Court Restraining Order Cannot Keep Jeffrey Wigand From Being Honored for
'Moral Courage, 'L.A. TIMEs, Apr. 25, 1996, at 16.
9. See Hunt Helm, Blowing the Whistle on Big Tobacco: Wigand, Williams Lifted
Secrecy's Veil-Their Revelations Changed the History of the Tobacco Industry, COURIER-J.
(Louisville), May, 25, 1997, at 1A. Scott Ballin, a former American Heart
Association lobbyist, in referring to Wigand and Williams, stated, "These people
stuck their necks out .... We've been dealing with this problem in this country
for decades. What they did served as a catalyst, and now in the past couple of
years things have moved very rapidly." Id. Richard Daynard, a Northeastern
University professor of law who heads of The Tobacco Products Liability Project,
commented:
What all of this did, was to provide tremendous grist for the process
of successive revelations that we've had. I think the public began to
experience this industry as an outlaw industry.
Courts are beginning to take that view as well, except of course, in
the state of Kentucky. This is a state where you can be enjoined (as
Williams was) from speaking to your own lawyer because you've taken on
a tobacco company. Kentucky is not a state where the normal rules are
going to apply, and I think that makes both of these guys especially
gutsy.
Id.
Stanton A. Glantz, a University of California at San Francisco professor, stated:
Wigand did basically three things. He brought what was in the
documents [leaked by Williams] into the present; the documents ended
in the mid-1980s, and he showed that it was all still going on. The
[Vol. 25
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In the past forty years, more than four hundred lawsuits have
been filed against tobacco companies for smoking-related
injuries." However, until a 1996 jury verdict in a Jacksonville,
Florida case, none had been successful. On August 9, 1996, in the
aforementioned case, Grady Carter, who had been treated for lung
cancer, received a $750,000jury verdict against B&W."2
On May 23, 1994, Mississippi was the first state to sue the
tobacco industry seeking reimbursement for Medicaid funds the
state had spent to treat smoking-related health problems. Other
states began to file similar suits. In July 1995, a federal grand jury
in New York began to investigate the tobacco companies'
representations to federal regulators regarding the content and
effect of cigarettes. 5 A Washington D.C. federal grand jury was
reportedly investigating whether tobacco company executives lied
under oath when they testified in April 1994 before a House of
Representatives subcommittee that they did not believe nicotine is
second thing is, he put a human face on it. The stuff we did (based on
the documents alone) is kind of dry reading. The third thing, the whole
fracas with CBS backing down and all that, couldn't be suppressed by the
cigarette companies.
Id.
David Kessler, former FDA commissioner, noted, "There's nothing
improper about [cooperating with federal officials]. This is the moral high
ground. No confidentiality agreement should prohibit people from cooperating
with federal officials in the middle of an investigation." Id.
10. See Bob Williams, New Legal Moves Threaten Tobacco Firms, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh), Dec. 24, 1995, at Al; Ex-smoker With Cancer Awarded $750,000
in Blow to Big Tobacco, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 10, 1996, at A8.
11. See Ex-smoker With Cancer Awarded $750,000, supra note 10, at A8. The
Jacksonville case was similar to the tobacco liability case described in John
Grisham's novel, THE RUNAWAYJURY, in which a jury returns a verdict against the
tobacco industry. In fact, prospective jurors in the Jacksonville case were asked
whether they had read THE RUNAWAY Jury. See Tobacco Giants Watch Liability Case
Brought by Cancer-stricken Man, ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 31, 1996, at C6.
12. See Freedman & Hwang, supra note 4, at Al. On May 5, 1997, R.J.
Reynolds received ajury verdict in its favor in the tobacco liability lawsuit in which
the company had been sued for the wrongful death of a long-time smoker who
died in 1995. SeeJohn Kennedy & Scott Gold, Cigarette Makers Get King-size Win;
KJ. Reynolds Did Not Cause Smoker's Death, Jury Rules, ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 6,
1997, at Al.
13. See Freedman & Hwang, supra note 4, at Al.
14. See Blowing the Whistle on Big Tobacco; A Chronology of the Smoking Wars,
COURIER-J. (Louisville), May 25, 1997, at 12A.
15. See Philip Hilts, Tobacco Firms Face Criminal Probe of Testimony; Product
Claims to be Examined, COURIER-J. (Louisville), July 26, 1995, at IA.
1999]
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addictive.' 6 On March 13, 1996, Brooke Group Ltd., owner of
Liggett Group, agreed to settle with five states suing the tobacco
industry.17 This was the first tobacco company to settle a smoking-
related injury case.18
In April 1997, a federal district courtjudge ruled that the FDA
may regulate cigarettes as a drug.' 9 By early spring 1997, twenty-two
states had sued the tobacco industry to recover Medicaid funds
spent to treat tobacco-related medical problems; eighteen
additional states had sued the tobacco industry byJune 20, 1997.20
On June 20, 1997, representatives of the suing states and the
tobacco industry announced a historic $368 billion settlement.
21
On July 3, 1997, Mississippi settled its lawsuit against the tobacco
industry for over three billion dollars and received its first payment
of $170 million on July 15, 1997.22 The lawsuit had been scheduled
16. See Mike Brown, Justice Official Confirms Probes of Tobacco Industry, COURIER-
J. (Louisville), Feb. 16, 1996, at lB.
17. See Chip Jones, Tobacco Struggles to Fight Off Its Enemies-The Industry is
Facing a Legal Onslaught, NEWSDAY, Apr. 7, 1996, at A34.
18. See id. In April 1996, Texas, West Virginia, Florida, Massachusetts, and
Louisiana each were paid $200,000 in the Liggett settlement. SeeJoe Ward, More
States Attack Tobacco With Lawsuits, COURIER-J. (Louisville), Apr. 13, 1996, at IA.
Liggett will pay those five states four billion dollars over nine years and 2.5
percent of Liggett profits for 25 years. Minnesota did not participate in this
settlement. See id.
19. See Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 966 F. Supp. 1374
(M.D.N.C. 1997), rev'd sub nom. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Food &
Drug Admin., 153 F.3d 155 (4th Cir. 1998), and petition for cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W.
3484 (U.S. Jan. 19, 1999) (No. 98-1152). On August 10, 1996, the FDA, on
instructions from President Clinton, had issued proposed regulations to limit
advertisement and sale of cigarettes to minors. See Nicotine Attack: Cigarette
Regulation Is Formally Proposed; Industry Sues to Halt It; Aiming at Use by Children, FDA
Says Firms Know The Product is Addictive; Harsh Government Criticism, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 11, 1996, at Al. The FDA report accompanying the regulations stated that a
drug is anything manufactured with the intent to "affect the structure or any
function of the body" and claimed jurisdiction over cigarettes. Id.
20. See Mary Dieter, Indiana Attorney General Looks Back at Talks, Ahead to His
Role, COURIER-J. (Louisville),June 22, 1997, at 12A.
21. See Alix M. Freedman & Suein L. Hwang, Burning Questions: Tobacco Pact's
Limits-And Its Loopholes-Presage Fierce Debate, WALL ST. J., June 23, 1997, at Al.
Under the settlement, B&W will dismiss its lawsuit against Wigand;
Wigand will be released from his confidentiality agreement on March 20, 1998, if
Congress approves the settlement by that date, or upon later congressional
approval, but Wigand still is restricted from disclosing trade secrets. Industry
Whistle-blower "Relieved, "ARIz. REPUBLIC, June 21, 1997, at A19; Kim Wessel, B&W
Dismisses Lawsuit Against Wigand; Ex-executive Still Has Confidentiality Deal, COURIER-
J. (Louisville), Aug. 1, 1997, at 3B.
22. See Tobacco Industry Cuts Deal; The State of Mississippi Will Receive $3.6 Billion
Even if the Historic National Settlement is Not Approved by Congress, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
[Vol. 25
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to go to trial the week following the settlement. On August 25,
1997, Florida settled its lawsuit against the tobacco industry for
24over eleven billion dollars. On August 29, 1997, Georgia finally
sued the tobacco industry to recoup Medicaid costs the state paid21
to treat tobacco-related health problems. On October 10, 1997,
the tobacco industry settled a class action lawsuit filed on behalf of
60,000 flight attendants. 26 The lawsuit had claimed adverse health
effects were caused by secondhand smoke they were exposed to
27while working on airliners.
In Part II, this article reviews the law concerning confidential
information, state cases involving confidentiality agreements, and
federal cases illustrating the conflict between a confidentiality
agreement and information necessary under a federal statute. Part
III discusses whistleblowing, whistleblowing statutes and cases, and
Wigand as a whistleblower. Finally, in Part IV, the article suggests a
public policy exception to confidentiality agreements.
II. CONFIDENTIALITY
A. Confidential Information
In the course of an employment relationship, the employer
may disclose trade secrets or other confidential information to the
28employee. So long as the information is proprietary to the
July 4, 1997, at A3; Cigarette Makers Make a $170 Million Payment, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, July 16, 1997, atAl0.
23. See Tobacco Industry Cuts Deal, supra note 22, at A10.
24. See Milo Geyelin & Suein L. Hwang, Florida Settles Suit With Tobacco Firms,
WALL ST.J., Aug. 26, 1997, atA3.
25. See Florida Inspires Georgia to Sue Cigarette Makers, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug.
30, 1997, at A20.
26. See Tobacco Throws in Towel Again, Settles Lawsuit, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Ot.
11, 1997, atAl.
27. See id. In a landmark agreement, on May 8, 1998, the state of Minnesota
and Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Minnesota reached a multibillion dollar
settlement with tobacco companies. See Minnesota: Tobacco Industry Settles Lawsuit
with State, Blue Cross/Blue Shield, BNA HEALTH CARE DAILY, May 11, 1998, at d5.
The settlement was for reimbursement for money spent on health care for those
harmed by tobacco. See id. The industry will pay the state $6.1 billion over the
next 25 years. See id. Texas settled its lawsuit with the tobacco industry for $15.3
billion. See id. Texas was the third state, and Minnesota the fourth, to settle suits
to recover the costs of treating tobacco-related health problems. See id. The other
two states are Florida and Mississippi. See id.
28. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 cmt. b (1958). A wide range
of information is protected, including "unique business methods of the employer,
1999]
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employer, is revealed in confidence, and is not of general
29
knowledge, the employee has a common law duty to the employer
to safeguard the employer's information. The duty generally
continues after the employment relationship ends;2" however, the
information must concern specific information rather than general
skill or know-how.s2
trade secrets, lists of names, and all other matters which are peculiarly known in
the employer's business." Id. A Florida court recognized a company's price list
containing the company's mark-up as confidential information. See Thomas v.
Alloy Fasteners, Inc., 664 So. 2d 59, 60 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995). A New York
court found that customer lists containing "information involving customer
coverage, premium amounts, cash values, and loans against existing policies" were
confidential information. SeeJohn Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Austin, 916 F.
Supp. 158, 165 (N.D.N.Y. 1996).
29. See Home Gas Corp. v. Deblois Oil Co., 691 F. Supp. 567, 574 (D.R.I.
1987). The Rhode Island court stated that whether information is confidential
"generally depends upon how readily ascertainable the information is for a person
conducting an independent investigation." Id. A New York court found that a
former employee did not breach his confidentiality agreement because the
allegedly confidential information was publicly available. See International Paper
Co. v. Suwyn, 966 F. Supp. 246, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("[T)he businesses at
issue... are comparatively low-technology industries, and Suwyn's work at
International Paper was driven by general managerial expertise as opposed to the
application of highly technical, proprietary, or secret information.").
30. See Rivendell Forest Prods., Ltd. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 824 F. Supp.
961, 968 (D. Colo. 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 28 F.3d 1042 (10th Cir. 1994);
Standard Brands, Inc. v. Zumpe, 264 F. Supp. 254, 262 (E.D. La. 1967); Mulei v.
Jet Courier Serv., Inc., 739 P.2d 889, 892 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987), rev'd on other
grounds, 771 P.2d 486 (Colo. 1989); Follmer, Rudzewicz & Co. v. Kosco, 362
N.W.2d 676, 680 (Mich. 1984). The Restatement (Second) on Agency provides:
Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is subject to a duty to the principal
not to use or to communicate information confidentially given him by
the principal or acquired by him during the course of or on account of
his agency or in violation of his duties as agent, in competition with or to
the injury of the principal, on his own account or on behalf of another,
although such information does not relate to the transaction in which he
is then employed, unless the information is a matter of general
knowledge.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 (1958).
31. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFAGENCY § 396 (1958). Unless the employee
has entered into a non-competition agreement, the employee may compete with
the former employer. See id. However, the employee may not use the former
employer's trade secrets and confidential information. See id. cmts. a & b.
32. See Lesser Dental Labs. v. Kidney, 492 P.2d 39, 42 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1971)
(quoting Roy v. Bolduc, 34 A.2d 479, 481 (Me. 1943)); American Shippers Supply
Co. v. Campbell, 456 N.E.2d 1040, 1043 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983); Lamb v. Quality
Inspection Servs., Inc. 398 So. 2d 643, 648 (La. Ct. App. 1981); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OFAGENCY § 395 cmts. a & d (1958). A Texas court held that a former
[Vol. 25
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The interests reflected in the employee's duty of
confidentiality are: (1) the public's interest in ensuring commercial
morality; (2) the employer's interest in freely communicating
information to an employee, 3 but at the same time protecting
information gained through significant expenditure;s and (3) the• . 35
employee's interest in gainful employment. The three interests
must be balanced against each other; a confidentiality agreement
may be unenforceable if public policy or the employee's interest
outweighs the interest of the employer.3 6  The employer's
competitor who hires the employee away should not be unjustly
enriched by pirating confidential information that the employee
has the duty to keep confidential. 37 A competitor allowed access to
confidential information might be able to undersell the employer.
Fear of easily losing information derived from costly research and
development might stifle an employer's desire to develop new
technology. 3 The employee may be valuable because of the
employee's skill and knowledge in a particular field. If the
employee was unfairly competing against his former employer because the
employee had been extensively trained by his employer and because that
extensive training consisted largely of confidential and proprietary information.
See Picker Int'l, Inc. v. Blanton, 756 F. Supp. 971, 979 (N.D. Tex. 1990).
33. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFAGENCY § 395 cmt. a (1958).
34. See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Ciavatta, 542 A.2d 879, 892 (N.J. 1988)
35. See id.
36. See id. at 894. The court in Ciavatta noted:
[T]he public has a clear interest in safeguarding fair commercial
practices and in protecting employers from theft or piracy of trade
secrets, confidential information, or, more generally, knowledge and
technique in which the employer may be said to have a proprietary
interest. The public has an equally clear and strong interest in fostering
creativity and invention and in encouraging technological improvement
and design enhancement of all goods in the marketplace.
Id. at 894-95.
In Folimer, Rudzewicz & Co. v. Kosco, the Michigan Supreme Court stated,
"An agreement that unduly limits a former employee's freedom to go into
business for himself or another, or extracts an excessive price for the privilege of
doing so, is unreasonable and hence unenforceable." 362 N.W.2d 676, 684
(Mich. 1984).
37. See Apollo Techs. Corp. v. Centrosphere Indus. Corp., 805 F. Supp. 1157,
1193 (D.N.J. 1992) (applying New York law and finding that non-disclosure
covenants in employment contracts are enforceable if the confidential
information is not available from an independent source, and then only when it is
necessary to protect the employer from unfair competition).
38. See Premix, Inc. v. Zappitelli, 561 F. Supp. 269, 276 (N.D. Ohio 1983).
1999l
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employee is not allowed to use the general skill and knowledge of
the field, the employee may not be able to find work in the field
and may suffer a loss of livelihood. 9
The common law protects trade secrets; the employee has a
duty not to disclose the former employer's trade secrets given to
the employee in confidence. 4° In addition, four-fifths of the states
protect trade secrets through statute; forty-one states and the
District of Columbia have adopted some variation of the Uniform
41Trade Secrets Act. Confidential information not amounting to a
39. See North Am. Paper Co. v. Unterberger, 526 N.E.2d 621, 623-24 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1988). This Illinois court held non-disclosure provisions of an
employment agreement unreasonable and unenforceable because they were
overbroad. See id. at 624. The court stated, "[T]he Agreement renders
Unterberger virtually unemployable in his field of occupation as well as other
related fields. Employment agreements which restrict an employee's ability to
earn a living in his field of occupation throughout an unreasonable geographical
area are against public policy and unenforceable." Id.
40. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 40, 41 (1995).
41. UNIW. TRADE SECRETS Acr §§ 1-12, 14 U.L.A. 437-67 (1988). States that
have adopted a variation of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act include: ALA. CODE §§
8-27-1 to 8-27-6 (Michie 1994); ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.50.910 to 45.50.945 (Michie
1994 & Supp. 1996); ARIz. REv. STAT. §§ 44-401 to 44-407 (West 1994); ARK. CODE
ANN. §§ 4-75-601 to 4-75-607 (Michie 1994 & Supp. 1996); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3426
to 3426.11 (West 1994 & Supp. 1996); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-74-101 to 7-74-
110 (West 1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-50 to 35-58 (West 1995 & Supp.
1996); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2001 to 2009 (Michie 1994 & Supp. 1996); D.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 48-501 to 48-510 (Michie 1994 & Supp. 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§
688.001 to 688.009 (West 1994 & Supp. 1996); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-760 to 10-1-
767 (Michie 1994); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 482B-1 to 48211-9 (Michie 1994 &
Supp. 1996); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 48-801 to 48-807 (West 1994); 765 ILL. STAT.
ANN. §§ 1065/1 to 1065/9 (Smith-Hurd 1995); IND. CODEANN. §§ 24-2-3-1 to 24-2-
3-8 (West 1995); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 550.1 to 550.8 (West 1995 & Supp. 1996);
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-3320 to 60-3330 (1993 & Supp. 1996); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 365.880 to 365.900 (Michie 1995); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:1431 to 51:1439
(West 1995); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1541 to 1548 (West 1994); MD. CODE
ANN., Com. Law I, §§ 11-1201 to 11-1209 (Michie 1994); MINN. STAT. §§ 325C.01
to 325C.08 (1998); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 75-26-1 to 75-26-19 (1992 & Supp. 1996);
MONT. CODEANN. §§ 30-14-401 to 30-14-409 (1993 & Supp. 1995); NEB. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 87-501 to 87-507 (Michie 1994); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 600A.010 to
600A.100 (1995); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 350-B:1 to 350-B:9 (Michie 1994); N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 57-3A-1 to 57-3A-7 (Michie 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-25.1-01 to
47-25.1-08 (1994); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1333.61 to 1333.69 (West 1994);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 78, §§ 85 to 94 (West 1994); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 646.461 to
646.475 (1993); R.I. GEN. LAws§§ 6-41-1 to 6-41-11 (Michie 1992); S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 39-8-1 to 39-8-130 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1998); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-
336 to 59.1-343 (Michie 1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 4601 to 4609, tit. 12, § 523
(Michie 1996); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-336 to 59.1-343 (Michie 1992 & Supp.
1998); W. VA. CODE §§ 47-22-1 to 47-22-10 (1990); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 134.90 (West
1990).
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trade secret is a protectable interest under common law
principles.2 Confidential information may also be protected under
a confidentiality agreement between the employer and the
employee.43
Companies may well fear theft of trade secrets and
confidential information. One industry group estimates losses due
to intellectual property theft at twenty-four billion dollars
annually. For example, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
collected evidence that, over seven years, a senior research
engineer at Avery Dennison Corporation allegedly sold in excess of
fifty million dollars in company secrets to a Taiwanese competitor
42. See Neveux v. Webcraft Techs., Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1568, 1571 (E.D. Mich.
1996) (applying NewJersey law); Heatron v. Shackelford, 898 F. Supp. 1491, 1500
(D. Kan. 1995); Vigitron, Inc. v. Ferguson, 419 A.2d 1115, 1119 (N.H. 1980);
Platinum Management, Inc. v. Dahms, 666 A.2d 1028, 1038 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Law Div.
1995); Bell Fuel Corp. v. Cattolico, 544 A.2d 450, 460 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988)
(finding that protection for confidential information is derived either from the
confidential relationship between employer and employee or from a non-
disclosure provision); Roto-Die Co. v. Lesser, 899 F. Supp. 1515, 1522 (W.D. Va.
1995). One court found that confidential information not amounting to a trade
secret is a protectable interest; a state's adoption of a variation on the Uniform
Trade Secrets Act did not bar the employer's lawsuit for breach of the agent's
duty of confidentiality. See Coulter Corp. v. Leinart, 869 F. Supp. 732, 736 (E.D.
Mo. 1994) (applying Florida law).
43. See Modern Controls, Inc. v. Andreadakis, 578 F.2d 1264, 1268 (8th Cir.
1978); NCH Corp. v. Broyles, 749 F.2d 247, 253 (5th Cir. 1985) (applying
Louisiana law); Diversified Fastening Sys., Inc. v. Rogge, 786 F. Supp. 1486, 1495
(N.D. Iowa 1991); Houston Oil & Minerals Corp. v. SEEC, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 990,
992 (W.D. La. 1985); Structural Dynamics Research Corp. v. Engineering
Mechanics Research Corp., 401 F. Supp. 1102, 1114 (E.D. Mich 1975) (noting
that Ohio enforces both reasonable confidentiality agreements and non-
competition agreements; while Michigan considers non-competition agreements
contrary to public policy, Michigan will enforce reasonable confidentiality
agreements); Saliterman v. Finney, 361 N.W.2d 175, 178 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985);
Kadis v. Britt, 29 S.E.2d 543, 547 (N.C. 1944); Perfect Fit Glove Co. v. Post, 635
N.Y.S.2d 917, 917 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995). In Torrence v. Hewitt Associates, the court
decided that because of "Torrence's position as a partner and his access to
confidential information of a sensitive nature, in combination with his unique
skills, Hewitt had a legitimate interest to protect." 493 N.E.2d 74, 78 (Ill. App. Ct.
1986). The confidential information was "financial data, future business plans,
client lists, confidential reports regarding flexible compensation ... [that] could
substantially affect competition in the field." Id. See also Stefan Rutzel, Snitching
for the Common Good: In Search of a Response to the Legal Problems Posed by
Environmental Whistleblowing, 14 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 1, 24 (1995).
44. See Dean Starkman, Secrets and Lies: the Dual Career of a Corporate Spy, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 23, 1997, at BI ("[I]nstances of corporate spying are on the rise,
spurred by increasingly tough global competition, a more mobile work force and
the new premium placed on corporations' intellectual property.").
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of Avery in return for payments totaling approximately $150,000. 45
In June 1997, the engineer signed a plea agreement, confessing his
guilt.46 Another incident involving alleged theft of trade secrets
concerns Eastman Kodak Company. In August 1997, an engineer
who retired from Kodak in 1992 pleaded guilty to one count of
trade theft.4 7  The engineer had allegedly provided proprietary
information to a Kodak competitor from 1993 to 1997. Kodak
recently sued Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing and its former
subsidiary, Imation, for trade secret theft in connection with Kodak
49secrets allegedly misappropriated by the former Kodak engineer.
In August, 1997, IGENE Biotechnology, Incorporated sued Archers
Daniels Midland ("ADM"), claiming a former IGENE employee
gave IGENE trade secrets concerning production of astaxanthin in
yeast cells to ADM.
50
The October 1997 United States Justice Department antitrust
suit against Microsoft Corp. involves confidentiality agreements
between Microsoft and its licensees. 51 The suit alleges that the
tying of Microsoft's Windows 95 to Microsoft's Internet browser
45. See id.
46. See id. The Economic Espionage Act, passed in 1996, makes trade secret
theft a federal felony. See id. Federal prosecutors brought the first three cases
under the act in the summer of 1997. See id. Summarizing the cases, Starkman
wrote:
In the PPG [Industries Inc.] case, two individuals pleaded guilty to trying
to sell the chemical company's proprietary information to a rival. The
Bristol-Myers Squibb [Co.] case involves an attempt by outsiders to bribe
an employee for details about a drug. The Gillette [Co.] case centers on
alleged theft by an outsider of trade secrets relating to a new shaving
system.
Id.
47. See William M. Bulkeley, Kodak Sues 3M, Imation Corp., Alleging Theft of
Trade Secrets, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 1997, at B15. 3M spun off Imation in 1996. See
id.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See Lawsuit Brews Over Keeping Salmon Rosy: A Biotech Firm Claims an Ex-
employee Leaked its Recipe for Tinting Fishey Salmon a Palatable Pink, ORLANDo
SENTINEL, Aug. 31, 1997, at A12. Astaxanthin is a compound that gives wild
salmon meat its distinctive color, which comes from crustaceans eaten by the
salmon. See id. IGENE is hoping to break into the astaxanthin market now
controlled by Hoffman-LaRoche by producing the compound in yeast cells. See
id.
51. See John R. Wilke, Microsoft Says US. Antitrust Case Aims At Stalling
Improvements in Windows, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 1997, at A4.
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violates the terms of a 1995 consent decree and licensee
confidentiality agreements are hampering the government's
investigation by prohibiting licensees from disclosing information
concerning license terms.
Where an employee leaves one company to work for a
competitor, the first company has sued the competitor to prevent
the former employee from disclosing confidential information to
the competitor. 3 In November 1997, Agfa, a unit of Germany's
Bayer AG, sued General Electric Co. ("GE") to prevent a former
Agfa vice president from disclosing Agfa customer and product
development information to GE, an Agfa competitor and new
employer of the former Agfa employee.54 A GE spokesperson
stated that "upon hiring from a competitor, GE has a rigorous
policy to insure that new employees understand their responsibility
not to use or disclose confidential information of a former
employer. ,5
The enforceability of a confidentiality agreement is not
uniform from state to state. Some states allow the confidentiality
agreement to be enforced only if "reasonable." What is reasonable
varies from state to state. Michigan, Georgia, Illinois, South
Dakota, Pennsylvania, and Virginia require a confidentiality
agreement to be reasonable. In contrast, a Texas court opined
that non-disclosure provisions are not against public policy and
"reasonable time, geographical, and scope-of-activity limitations are
not prerequisites to enforceability."
57
In Michigan, a court must "scrutinize" a confidentiality
agreement to determine whether "it goes beyond what is
reasonably necessary for the protection of confidential
information. 5 s Georgia interprets "reasonable" to require that the
confidentiality agreement be written so that the non-disclosure
provision is "reasonably related to the protection of the
52. See id; Bryan Gruley et al., U.S. Sues Microsoft Over PC Browser: Move to
Restrict Bundling with Windows 95 Hits Key Market Strategy, WALL ST. J. Oct. 21, 1997,
at A3; John R. Wilke & Don Clark, Computer Firms Tell of Microsoft's Tough Tactics,
WALL ST.J., Oct. 23, 1997, at A3.
53. See Wilke, supra note 51, at A4.
54. See id.
55. William M. Carley, Bayer's Agfa Unit Sues GE to Prevent Ex-employee From
Divulging Secrets, WALL ST. J., Nov. 24, 1997, at B14.
56. See infra notes 58-70.
57. Zep Mfg. Co. v. Harthcock, 824 S.W.2d 654, 663 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
58. Follmer, Rudzewicz & Co. v. Kosco, 362 N.W.2d 676, 683 (Mich. 1984).
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information 5 9 and the enforceability of the provision "turns on
factors of time and the nature of the business interest sought to be
protected."6 °  Thus, a Georgia court is likely to strike down a
confidentiality agreement either because it is of unlimited
duration 61 or because the information which the confidentiality
62agreement purports to protect is overbroad.
Illinois' interpretation of "reasonable" is even more restrictive
than that of Georgia. To determine whether the subject matter
covered by the nondisclosure provision is reasonable, a court must
consider three factors: "whether enforcement of the covenant will
injure the public, whether enforcement will cause undue hardship
to the promisor and whether the restraint imposed by the covenant
is greater than is necessary to protect the interests of the
employer." 63 In addition to requiring a reasonable time duration
59. Durham v. Stand-By Labor, Inc., 198 S.E.2d 145, 149-50 (Ga. 1973).
60. Id. at 149. In Durham, the court acknowledged that customer lists and
information might be protected under the contract in litigation but remanded for
the trial court to determine "the legitimacy of the need to maintain the
confidentiality of such information." Id. at 150.
61. See Wesley-Jessen, Inc. v. Armento, 519 F. Supp. 1352, 1362 (N.D. Ga.
1981); Equifax Servs., Inc. v. Examination Management Servs., Inc., 453 S.E.2d
488, 491 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) ("[T]his agreement does not merely fail to add a
durational limitation to an otherwise enforceable agreement . . . . [Ilt
affirmatively and unequivocally states that confidential information will not be
disclosed by the employee 'at any time' after his course of employment."); Stahl
Headers, Inc. v. MacDonald, 447 S.E.2d 320, 322 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (finding a
non-disclosure agreement unenforceable because its duration was unlimited).
62. See Duracell Inc. v. SW Consultants, Inc., 126 F.R.D. 571, 575 (N.D. Ga.
1989); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Baum, 629 F. Supp. 466, 471 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (stating
that the non-disclosure provision was overbroad); Equifax, 453 S.E.2d at 491;
Sunstates Refrigerated Servs., Inc. v. Griffin, 449 S.E.2d 858, 860 (Ga. Ct. App.
1994) (holding a non-disclosure provision enforceable because it was reasonable
as to time period covered and information protected); American Software USA,
Inc. v. Moore, 448 S.E.2d 206, 209 (Ga. 1994) (holding a non-disclosure covenant
properly limited to "trade secrets" and "confidential business information" not
publicly available nor properly learned from a third party); Kern Mfg. Corp. v.
Sant, 355 S.E.2d 437, 443 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that a jury must decide
whether a non-disclosure provision is legitimately needed to protect the
company's confidential information); Lane Co. v. Taylor, 330 S.E.2d 112, 117 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1985) (finding that referenced information in a non-disclosure covenant
was not overly broad); Service Ctr., Inc. v. Minogue, 535 N.E.2d 1132, 1137 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1989) (finding that the non-disclosure provision requiring the agent to
keep secret information "concerning or in any way relating" to services offered
was overbroad).
63. Tower Oil & Tech. Co. v. Buckley, 425 N.E.2d 1060, 1065 (Ill. App. Ct.
1981). Accord AMP Inc. v. Fleischhacker, 823 F.2d 1199, 1202 (7th Cir. 1987);
R.R. Donnelly & Sons Co. v. Fagan, 767 F. Supp. 1259, 1269 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(applying Illinois law); Ntron Int'l Sales Co. v. Carroll, 714 F. Supp. 335, 337
[Vol. 25
14
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 14
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol25/iss2/14
AT WHAT PRICE SILENCE
for non-disclosure, the non-disclosure must be reasonable in terms
of the geographical area encompassed.r4  South Dakota's
interpretation of "reasonable" is similarly restrictive. In South
Dakota, non-disclosure provisions "are strictly construed and
enforced only to the extent reasonably necessary to protect the
employer's interest in confidential information. 6  The provisions
are unenforceable "[I]f (1) a trade secret or confidential
relationship does not exist, (2) the employer discloses the
information to others not in a confidential relationship, or (3) it is
legitimately discovered and openly used by others."66 In addition,
the non-disclosure must be reasonable in duration and in
67geographical area covered. North Carolina and Pennsylvania
require that the non-disclosure provision be limited in time and
geography to safeguard empl0rer confidential information no
more than reasonably necessary.
Virginia uses a three-part test to determine the enforceability
of a non-disclosure provision:
69
1. Is the restraint on circumvention no broader than is
necessary, from the standpoint of the trade secret holder,
to protect the holder from the disclosure of its
(N.D. Ill. 1989); Telxon Corp. v. Hoffman, 720 F. Supp. 657, 666 (N.D. Il1. 1989)
(holding that lack of time limitations on a non-disclosure provision is
"problematic"); Perman v. Arcventures, Inc., 554 N.E.2d 982, 986 (Ill. App. Ct.
1990) (holding that a confidentiality agreement was unenforceable where it did
not contain a limitation on duration or geographical scope); Disher v. Fulgoni,
464 N.E.2d 639, 643 (I11. App. Ct. 1984) (finding that confidentiality agreements
should be subject to "careful scrutiny").
64. See Tower Oil, 425 N.E.2d at 1065.
65. 1st American Sys., Inc. v. Rezatto, 311 N.W.2d 51, 57 (S.D. 1981).
66. Id.
67. See id. at 56. In Walling Chemical Co. v. Bigner, the court reviewed a non-
disclosure provision under the three part test of Rezatto and under the time and
geographical limitations suggested in Rezatto before finding the provision
reasonable. 349 N.W.2d 647, 650 (S.D. 1984).
68. See Henry Hope X-Ray Prod., Inc. v. Marron Carrel, Inc., 674 F.2d 1336,
1342 (9th Cir. 1982); Electrical South, Inc. v. Lewis, 385 S.E.2d 352, 355 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1989). In Henry Hope, the court found that the non-disclosure provisions
were reasonable even without time and geographical limitations. See Henry Hope,
674 F.2d at 1342. The time limitation was implicit because the non-disclosure
provisions covered only "confidential" information. See id. Thus, when
information became public, it would no longer be subject to the non-disclosure
provisions. See id. No express geographical limitation was necessary because
Henry Hope had international sales. See id.
69. See Eden Hannon & Co. v. Sumitomo Trust & Banking Co., 914 F.2d 556,
563 (4th Cir. 1990).
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confidential information?
2. From the standpoint of the party who received the
confidential information, is the restraint reasonable in the
sense that it is not unduly harsh and oppressive in
curtailing the legitimate efforts of that party to conduct its
business?
3. Is the restraint reasonable from the standpoint of
sound public policy?
70
The reasons the employer might require an employee to sign a
confidentiality agreement are many. The confidentiality
agreement can identify certain specified information as
confidential and can remind the employee in writing of the
employee's duty to keep the information secret.7' Because the
information must be secret and not generally known to be
protected, the confidentiality agreement is evidence that the
employer gave the employee the information in confidence.72
Thus, having the employee sign a confidentiality agreement is a
reasonable precaution the employer might take to protect theS73
secrecy of confidential information. Because confidential
information is protectable, while the employee's general skill and
experience is not, a confidentiality agreement can distinguish
between confidential information and general skill and
experience.74  A state may interpret a written confidentiality
agreement to give greater employer protection than the protection
afforded under common law.
The existence of a written confidentiality agreement may deter
a prospective employer from hiring a prospective employee. This
is especially true where the employee would inevitably reveal the
former employer's confidential information, and the former
70. Id.
71. See Miles J. Feldman, Comment, Toward a Clearer Standard of Protectable
Information: Trade Secrets and the Employment Relationship, 9 HIGH TECH. L.J. 151,180
(1994).
72. See id. at 181.
73. See id. at 155.
74. See id.
75. See, e.g., Cincinnati Tool Steel Co. v. Breed, 482 N.E.2d 170, 174 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1985). In Illinois, this distinction clearly exists; the Cincinnati Tool court
stated, "While an enforceable restrictive covenant may protect material which
does not constitute a trade secret, an employer's protection absent a restrictive
covenant is narrower and extends only to trade secrets.., or near permanent
customer relationships." Id.
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employer has a reputation for strictly enforcing its contracts
through litigation. The confidentiality agreement identifies for a
prospective employer the information the former employerS 76
considered confidential. A written confidentiality agreement may
furnish enough proof to make it more likely that the employer will
succeed in a lawsuit filed against the employee for breaching the
employee's duty of confidentiality.77
The confidentiality agreement allows the employer to fashion
a remedy for an employee's breach tailored to the situation. The
usual remedy imposed after a court determines that an employee
has breached a confidentiality agreement or is likely to do so is
78enjoining the employee from revealing confidential information.
A confidentiality agreement may require an employee to return
specified documents upon termination of employment or may
require the breaching former employee to pay the former
employer damages.79
B. Limitations on Enforcement of Confidentiality Agreements
More companies are requiring employees to sign• • 80
confidentiality agreements. Because a confidentiality agreement
76. See Feldman, supra note 71, at 181.
77. See Overholt Crop Ins. Serv. Co. v. Travis, 941 F.2d 1361, 1366 (8th Cir.
1991) (suggesting that non-disclosure provisions are evidence of a confidential
relationship between employer and employee); Bell Fuel Corp. v. Cattolico, 544
A.2d 450, 461 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (noting that a non-disclosure provision is
evidence of the confidential relationship between employer and employee and
the confidential nature of the information subject to the provision); Cincinnati
Tool, 482 N.E.2d at 180. An Ohio court commented, "[w]ithout the non-
disclosure agreements this court might have granted a temporary injunction.
Adding non-disclosure agreements to the case law of this state the court certainly
sees its duty to grant a temporary injunction .... " H.J. Sherwood Inc. v. Fibeco,
Inc., 234 N.E.2d 531, 533 (Ohio Misc. 1967). In a case from Rhode Island, the
court found that the fact that only one of a number of employees who had access
to information was required to sign a non-disclosure provision was evidence that
the information was not "confidential" in nature. See Nestle Food Co. v. Miller,
836 F. Supp. 69, 75 (D.R.I. 1993).
78. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. American Potash & Chem. Corp.,
200 A.2d 428, 431 (Del. Ch. 1964); Concept, Inc. v. Thermotemp, Inc., 553 So. 2d
1325, 1327 (Fla. Ct. App. 1989); Gonzales v. Zamora, 791 S.W.2d 258, 267 (Tex.
App. 1990);
79. Follmer, Rudzewicz & Co. v. Kosco, 362 N.W.2d 676, 682 (Mich. 1984).
In Follmer, the employee had agreed to pay the former employer damages, based
upon a formula, if the employee attracted customers of the former employer. See
id.
80. See Margaret A. Jacobs, Will Promises of Silence Pass Tests in Court?, WALL ST.
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requires employee silence in return for emsiloyment, the
agreement is sometimes nicknamed a "golden gag." However, the
employee's duty to safeguard the employer's or former employer's
trade secrets and confidential information is not absolute. Under
common law contract and agency principles, a court should be able
to set aside a non-disclosure provision if the provision is
unconscionable or contrary to public policy.8s  In certain
circumstances, public policy or an interest of the employee may
outweigh enforcement of a confidentiality agreement.
No reported case has decided whether an employee can blow
the whistle in the face of a confidentiality agreement; a California
court did consider whether "the statutory privilege for statements
made in judicial proceedings.., preclude Is] liability for an
otherwise wrongful disclosure of trade secrets."
8 4
Presumably, employees other than Wigand have been sued for
breaching confidentiality agreements. The absence of reported
cases may be because the parties settled, thereby avoiding
disclosure of confidential information during trial, or because trial
level decisions were not reported.
A number of law review articles raise the issue of what the limit
should be on safeguarding information purportedly protected
under a confidentiality agreement.85 Several of the articles seem to
suggest balancing the employer's need to protect proprietary
information against the employee's and society's need for
J., Dec. 14, 1995, at BI.
81. See Carton & Kerber, supra note 1, at BI.
82. See infra notes 437-69 and accompanying text.
83. See Rutzel, supra note 43, at 26. In Khair v. Campbell Soup Co., the
question was raised whether the employee could blow the whistle to the EEOC
where the employer's counterclaim alleged that the disclosure violated a
confidentiality agreement. 893 F. Supp. 316, 321 (D.NJ. 1995). The court noted,
"[T]here is a serious issue as to whether under New Jersey law a confidentiality
agreement or common law duty may frustrate the right of an employee to report
his employer's illegal conduct to the appropriate government agency." Id. at 337.
The court made no decision on the merits of the issue because the issue was
raised on a motion for summary judgment. See id. at 322. The court refused to
grant the employer's motion for summary judgment on the counterclaim. See id.
at 337.
84. ITT Telecom Prods. Corp. v. Dooley, 262 Cal. Rptr. 773, 774 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1989).
85. See, e.g., Terry Morehead Dworkin & Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Employee
Disclosures to the Media: When is a "Source" a "Sorcerer", 15 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT.
LJ. 357 (1993); Nicholas M. Rongine, Toward a Coherent Legal Response to the Public
Policy Dilemma Posed by Whistleblowing, 23 AM. Bus. LJ. 280 (1985).
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disclosure. One article states:
An examination of the term "trade secret," as it is defined
in a variety of sources, indicates that trade secret
principles cannot legitimately be used to defeat
protection for.., the whistleblower.... All sources of
trade secret law observe certain limitations, explicitly or
implicitly excluding from protection information
concerning wrongdoing.
86
Another article states:
The basic moral argument in support of the whistleblower
is that, while the organization is owed a duty, such a duty
is not absolute. When the organization engages in illegal
or immoral activity that would be injurious to the society,
then the employee has the (moral) right to blow the
whistle. The right is grounded on the principle that,
when the organization breaks the legal and/or moral
rules of the society and when such infractions will result in
public harm, the employee's contractual obligation of
loyalty loses its moral foundation. 7
Several other articles boldly proclaim that an employer cannot
use trade secret laws or confidentiality agreements to conceal the
type of wrongdoing which whistleblower statutes are designed to
disclose. One article states:
Under tort law concepts... whistleblowers clearly have a
privilege to reveal information regarding wrongdoing,
even if in so doing they also disclose trade secrets....
[W]histleblower protection laws should be interpreted to
resist circumvention by trade secret principles. Although
statutory schemes vary widely, their universal goal is to
encourage whistleblowing as a method of exposing and
reducing wrongdoing. The societal interests implicated
in this context are superior to any interest the employer
might assert in the confidentiality of information
regarding misconduct. However, an employer would be
able to seek redress for a disclosure that would otherwise
86. Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 85, at 387.
87. Rongine, supra note 85, at 286.
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be a trade secret, if it were subsequently determined not
to provide evidence of unlawful or harmful activity.8
One authority has opined that a whistleblower's true
allegation of wrongdoing does not violate a confidentiality
agreement whereas false allegations would.89 A confidentiality
agreement would be construed against the employer drafter and
public policy would not allow the confidentiality agreement to
cover illegal activity.90
The same author raises concern for employee liability for
whistleblowing in those states without statutory or common law
protection for whistleblowers.9 The same assertion is even more
boldly made in a case concerning B&W documents allegedly stolen
by a former paralegal of a law firm representing B&W. In dicta,
thejudge emphasized:
Whatever may be the proper result in a suit for damages
between the private contending parties-a matter on
which the Court expresses no opinion-on another
question there can be no doubt: the right of federal
public health and safety authorities to the custody of the
documents evidencing dangers to public health or
concealment of knowledge of such dangers by those in a
position to abate them clearly prevails over purely private
93claims involving contracts or torts.
88. Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 85, at 389 (footnotes omitted).
89. See Rutzel, supra note 43, at 24-26.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See Maddox v. Williams, 855 F. Supp. 406, 415 (D.D.C. 1994), aff'd sub
nom. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams, 62 F.3d 408 (D.C. Cir.
1995).
93. Id. A newspaper also proclaimed that confidentiality agreements are
unenforceable if contrary to public policy. See This is the law?, COURIER-J.
(Louisville), Dec. 3, 1995, at 2D. The newspaper comment came after a Kentucky
state judge ruled that Wigand could not give a deposition after being subpoenaed
by Mississippi because of his confidentiality agreement with B&W. See id. The
newspaper stated:
Confidentiality agreements are routinely declared illegal when they are
judged to be contrary to public policy. Which is more important: the
need for the state to know what Mr. Wigand knows, or a parochial
agreement between two parties? And confidentiality agreements were
never meant to obscure or hide important evidence in legal cases
anyway. They were created to protect trade secrets from competitors,
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C. Analogous State Cases
Although scarce, some case law illustrates situations in which
another interest was superior to a non-disclosure provision.94 The
closest case is !TT Telecom Products Corp. v. Dooley,95 a case
concerning California's statutory privilege for statements made in
916
judicial proceedings. In TT, the court held that "the privilege
does not apply to the voluntary disclosure of trade secrets in
violation of a contract of confidentiality" in a lawsuit between ITT
and a customer, but the privilege would allow Dooley, the ITT
former employee, to testify in ITT's lawsuit against Dooley for
unauthorized disclosure of trade secrets.97 The next closest case is
Lachman v. Sperry-Sun Well Surveying Co.,98 a case in which the Tenth
Circuit ruled that a non-disclosure provision was unenforceable
against an independent contractor. A similar situation was found
in Re v. Horstmann,'0° where a court ruled that non-disclosure
provisions were unenforceable against a business associate.10'
In TT, Dooley became an employee of ITT's predecessor and
signed a confidentiality agreement in 1967, agreeing not to
disclose secret or confidential information without the employer's
permission. 10 2 In 1977, ITT acquired all the assets of Dooley's
employer and Dooley continued as an employee of ITT until July
1982. Intercontinental De Communicaciones Por Satelite, S.A.
("Intercomsa") had purchased a telephone switching system from
ITT, and a dispute arose between Intercomsa and ITT over
Intercomsa's claim that the system was defective. 0 4 ITT demanded
arbitration in October 1982, and Intercomsa filed suit over the
allegedly defective system in April 1983.1°' A consulting firm hired
which is not the issue here.
Id.
94. See infra notes 95-174.
95. 262 Cal. Rptr. 773 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
96. See id. at 774.
97. Id. at 783.
98. 457 F.2d 850 (10th Cir. 1972).
99. See id. at 854.
100. No. C.A. 83C-FE-82, 1987 WL 16710, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 11,
1987).
101. See id. at *4.
102. See ITT, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 775.
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See id.
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Dooley in October 1982 as an expert consultant for Intercomsa.
6
As a consultant, Dooley provided information to Intercomsa
concerning whether the system conformed to ITT's specifications
and to the contract between ITT and Intercomsa.' °7  After
balancing the "interest in accurate judicial proceedings" against
ITT's interest in enforcing Dooley's confidentiality agreement, the
court held that Dooley was not privileged to breach the
confidentialiV agreement by providing information to
Intercomsa.'0  The court carefully noted, "[T]here is no claim
Dooley's disclosures were judicially compelled. Dooley does not
argue that his alleged breach of contract is excused because his
performance was prevented by operation of law... or that the
nondisclosure agreement is unenforceable because its object or the
consideration is illegal."
In Lachman, lessees were producing oil and gas from a well
drilled at some earlier date by an independent contractor."0 The
lessees hired Sperry-Sun to complete a directional survey of the
well."' The contract between the lessees and Sperry-Sun
prohibited Sperry-Sun from disclosing information concerning the
survey to any third party." 2 The survey showed that the well angled
off such that, at the levels producing oil and gas, the well was
producing from the adjoining property.1 3 Sperry-Sun employees
informed the parties who owned the oil and gas rights on the
adjoining property that the well bottomed within the area of their
oil and gas rights.14 In a judgment against the lessees, the parties
received the right to the oil and gas proceeds originating within
their boundary line; the lessees had to stop up the well at the
boundary line."15  The lessees in turn sued Sperry-Sun for
breaching the non-disclosure provision of the contract.
The Lachman court explained that Oklahoma law prohibits
misappropriating the natural gas rights of another."'
106. See id.
107. See id. at 775-76.
108. Id. at 781.
109. Id.
110. See Lachman, 457 F.2d at 851.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See id. at 851-52.
117. See id. at 852-53.
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Unintentional misappropriation is punishable by a fine paid to the
adjoining owner."8 The fine is a maximum of $500 per day of the
misappropriation. Intentional misappropriation is a criminal
offense.' The court held that although the lessees' action was
tortious rather than criminal, public policy could not allow the
lessees to enforce the contract and silence Sperry-Sun. 1' ° The court
noted that:
It is public policy in Oklahoma and everywhere to
encourage the disclosure of criminal activity .... The
distinction between a crime and a mere tort can often, as
here, be a difference brought about by time, and
knowledge.... A party bound by contract to silence, but
suspecting that its silence would permit a crime to go
undetected, would be forced to choose between
breaching the contract and hoping an actual crime is
eventually proven, or honoring the contract while a
possible crime goes unnoticed."
In Re, Re required Horstmann and Constantinou to sign non-
disclosure agreements before allowing Horstmann and
122Constantinou to view Re's invention. Horstmann subsequently
contacted Delaware law enforcement agents alleging fraud against
Re.13 Re's associate, Wilkinson, entered a Robinson plea of guilty to
securities violation charges and Re entered into a cease and desist
124
order with the Office of the Delaware Attorney General. Re sued
Horstmann and Constantinou claiming damages for breach of the
non-disclosure agreements. 115 The court dismissed Re's claim for
breach of the non-disclosure agreements, holding that the
disclosures to law enforcement agents were privileged because they
were in the public interest, resulting in criminal charges against
Wilkinson and Re entering into a cease and desist order.
118. Seeid. at853.
119. Seeid. at 852-53.
120. See id. at 853.
121. Id.
122. See Re, 1987 WL 16710, at *1.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See id. at *2.
126. See id. In so holding, the court quoted from comment d of section 757 of
the 1939 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS: "[A] privilege to disclose may also be given by
the law, independently of the other's consent, in order to promote some public
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Courts in two other cases indicated in dicta that disclosure of
confidential information is privileged in certain circumstances.
The two cases are United States v. Wallington127 and Systems
Operations, Inc. v. Scientific Games Development Corp.1
28
In Wallington, Wallington, an employee of the Regional
Intelligence Branch of the Customs Service, gathered some
information from a government computer database for an old
friend.' 29 Wallington turned the information over to the friend in
violation of Customs Service policy to maintain the security of
database information. 3° Wallington was convicted of violating 18
U.S.C. section 1905, which prohibits disclosure of government
confidential information. 13  Wallington appealed his conviction,
claiming that the statute was invalid on its face. 13
One of Wallington's challenges to the statute was that it was a
"constitutionally overbroad regulation of expression" on its face. 3
The court held that the statute was not facially unconstitutional,
but commented that it could be held to be unconstitutional as
applied in "an extraordinary case." 134 In dicta, the court stated,
"Admittedly, in an extraordinary case, an employee's interest in
expression on a matter of vital public concern might well outweigh
the government's interest in confidentiality."
35
In Systems, Systems Operations, Inc. ("Systems") was a
consulting firm involved in the development and marketing of
public lotteries.136  Scientific Games Development Corp.
("Scientific") conducted a similar business, particularly concerning
instant lotteries.137 Several representatives of Scientific allegedly
told state lottery officials from several states that Systems' instant
lottery tickets could be easily "broken" (i.e., read without scraping
the cover over the numbers). ' 8 The Scientific representatives
interest." Re, 1987 WL 16710, at *2.
127. 889 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1989).
128. 414 F. Supp. 750 (D.N.J. 1976), reversed because choice of law principles not
applied, 555 F.2d 1131 (3d Cir. 1977).
129. See Wallington, 889 F.2d at 574-75.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. Id. at 580.
134. Id. at 579.
135. Id.
136. See Systems, 414 F. Supp. at 751.
137. See id.
138. See id. at 755.
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allegedly refused to reveal to state lottery officials how the Systems'
tickets could be broken.
3 9
Systems sued Scientific requesting that the court enjoin
Scientific from disparaging Systems' products.14 The court held
that Scientific had the burden of proving that their statements
concerning Systems' products were true. Scientific refused to
disclose to the court how Systems' tickets could be broken, either
to avoid disclosing trade secrets or to avoid disclosing to Systems
how the Systems tickets could be broken.4 2 The court commented
that any disclosure by Scientific would be privileged.14 The court
noted, "Trade secrets are not privileged and must be disclosed
when a substantial need exists."' The court also noted, "[T]o the
extent that Scientific Games' representatives will act at the request
of lottery directors and give full assistance in the public interest,
this Court considers such activity privileged., 145 The court held:
[W]hen the defendants are responding to written
requests for assistance in ticket evaluation from a lottery
director and such responses as relate to ticket security are
accompanied by a full and factual explanation of how a
ticket was determined to be insecure, the defendants'
statements are privileged. This qualified privilege is
brought about in these circumstances because of the
strong public interest in the security of lottery tickets.' 6
The appellate court reversed, finding that the lower court had
failed to apply New Jersey law.
147
In its 1997-1998 term, the United States Supreme Court
considered whether an injunction entered against a former
employee disclosing General Motors Corporation's ("GM") trade
secrets, confidential information, and information covered by
client-attorney work product was enforceable against a third party
139. See id. at 761.
140. See id. at 751.
141. See id. at 761.
142. See id. at 762.
143. See id. at 763.
144. Id. at 762.
145. Id. at 763 (citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 772 (1939)).
146. Id. at 765-66.
147. See Systems Operations, Inc. v. Scientific Games Dev. Corp., 555 F.2d 1131,
1136 (3d Cir. 1977).
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148
in a products liability action. The case was tried in federal court
under the court's diversity jurisdiction.'49 In Baker v. General Motors
Corp.,150 the sons of a woman killed in an automobile accident sued
GM claiming that a faulty fuel pump in the Chevrolet Blazer in
which their mother was riding caught on fire and caused her
death.' At trial, a former GM employee, Ronald Elwell, was
allowed to testify. 152 As a GM employee, Elwell was a fifteen-year
member of GM's Engineering Analysis staff, a staff responsible for
reviewing the engineering of company vehicles in connection with
the defense of products liability litigation and assisting GM
attorneys in the litigation.'5 After termination as a GM employee,
Elwell testified against GM in a products liability lawsuit and sued
GM for wrongful termination. 54- GM counterclaimed and sought
an injunction prohibiting Elwell from disclosing privileged andc n . . . '55
confidential information. The Michigan court entered a
preliminary injunction, the parties settled, and the Michigan court
entered a permanent injunction based on the settlement. 56 The
permanent injunction prohibited Elwell from disclosing GM trade
secrets, confidential information, and privileged information and
testifying without GM's prior written consent; however, Elwell
could testify under court order.
57
The Eighth Circuit reversed the Missouri federal district court
148. See Brief for Petitioners at *5, *25-*26, Baker v. General Motors Corp.,
No. 96-653, 1997 WL 278921 (U.S. May 23, 1997). Petitioners noted:
The issue is not limited to the auto industry, nor is it limited to civil
litigation between private parties. For example, Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corporation procured a Kentucky state-court injunction against
Jeffrey Wigand, former vice-president for research and development at
Brown & Williamson, in an attempt to prevent him form being called to
testify by the Mississippi Attorney General in a civil case in a Mississippi
court. Four tobacco companies have also sought injunctions from a
North Carolina court to prevent former Liggett Group executives from
testifying in tobacco cases brought by state attorneys general.
Id. at *22 (footnotes omitted).
149. See id. at *3.
150. 86 F.3d 811 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 1310 (1997).
151. See Baker, 86 F.3d at 814.
152. See id. at 815.
153. See id. at 815 n.1.
154. See id. at 815.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See Brief for Petitioners, 1997 WL 278921, at *5-*8.
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$11.3 million verdict against GM. l'8 In reversing, the circuit court
held, among other rulings, that the Michigan injunction was
entitled to full faith and credit. 5 9 The circuit court rejected the
district court ruling that Missouri public policy favored disclosure
of nonprivileged and relevant information, finding that Missouri
policy in favor of full faith and credit was equally as strong.160
Another line of cases concerns the enforceability of settlement
agreements. Two of the cases, Bowman v. Parma Board of
Education'61 and Allen v. Jordanos' Inc.,'r" address whether a
settlement agreement is enforceable against a former employer
who discloses allegedly illegal or discreditable activities of a former
employee. The Bowman court held that the non-disclosure
provision requiring the school district to keep its investigation of
the alleged pedophilia of a former district teacher was void as
against public policy. 63  The Allen court held that the
nondisclosure agreement was unenforceable because "[a] bargain
which includes as part of its consideration nondisclosure of
discreditable facts is illegal."' 64
In Bowman, a teacher in the Parma City school district resigned
after the Parma Board of Education began to investigate charges of
165child molestation against the teacher. In the settlement
agreement, the district agreed not to disclose the circumstances
surrounding the teacher's resignation. 66 After the Lorain City
school district hired the teacher, a Parma school board member
subsequently informed the president of the Lorain Board of
Education of the circumstances of the teacher's resignation.167 The
teacher sued the Parma school board for disclosing information in
violation of the settlement agreement.168 The court held the non-
disclosure clause void as against public policy because it required
suppression of criminal conduct.' 6
In Allen, the employer claimed theft and dishonesty of an
158. See Baker, 86 F.3d. at 820.
159. See id.
160. See id. at 819.
161. 542 N.E.2d 663 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988).
162. 125 Cal. Rptr. 31 (Ct. App. 1975).
163. See Bowman, 542 N.E.2d at 664-66.
164. Allen, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 34.
165. See Bowman, at 665-66.
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. See id. at 664.
169. See id. at 666.
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employee."O The employer orally agreed not to disclose the
claimed theft and dishonesty in exchange for the employer laying
off the employee and allowing the employee to collect
unemployment and union benefits. Under California law, it is a
misdemeanor to withhold or fail to report relevant information to
the Department of Human Resources Development, the
department responsible for administering unemployment
benefits. 172  When the employer allegedly breached the
nondisclosure agreement, the employee sued. The court held
that the agreement was void because it was based on an illegal
174act.
The other settlement cases concern whether employer-
employee settlement agreements are enforceable against the
federal government or against an employee making a claim under
a federal statute. Those cases are discussed in the following
section.
D. Federal Cases
Another line of cases concerned whether an employer-
employee settlement or confidentiality agreement was enforceable
where information was sought under a federal statute. The
agreements prohibited the employee or former employee from
disclosing employment-related information. In contrast to the
Wigand situation in which B&W sued to enforce non-disclosure
provisions, 175 the requested action in each of the cases was to
challenge the enforcement of a non-disclosure provision. In each
case, the challenge to enforcement of the non-disclosure provision
had a public policy flavor. Of the eight cases more fully discussed
below, five involved the federal government or a federal agency or
department as the party requesting that a non-disclosure provision
be set aside.' 76 The other three cases were lawsuits brought by
private parties under federal employment anti-discrimination
statutes, in which the plaintiff asked that fellow former employees
170. See Allen, 125 Cal Rptr. at 32.
171. See id.
172. See id. at 33.
173. See id. at 31.
174. See id. at 34.
175. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Wigand, 913 F. Supp. 530, 531
(W.D. Ky. 1996).
176. See infta notes 187-240.
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be relieved from non-disclosure obligations."' Three of the cases
involved the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
78
("EEOC"). Other cases involved claims under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,'79 the False Claims Act,' s the Energy
Reorganization Act of 1974"" and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act;182  another involved a claim of sexual
discrimination.
The common thread running through all of the decisions is
that it is contrary to public policy to block communication needed
to carry out the purpose of a federal act. 18 In all but one of the
cases,184 the court held that the settlement agreement was not
enforceable at least to some extent because enforcement of the
settlement agreement would have deprived the government of
information. In one case, the settlement of an employment
discrimination case filed twelve years before was held enforceable
where the government had had the opportunity to gather relevant
information through deposition and testimony.
EEOC v. Astra USA, Inc. s7 is one of the most recent of the
cases. In June 1996, the EEOC challenged the enforceability of
settlements between Astra USA and employees. 18 The EEOC
claimed that the settlements had hindered its investigation into
accusations against the company of widespread sexual harassment
and a hostile work environment. 89
In Astra, the EEOC had contacted employees of Astra to
investigate three sexual harassment charges filed against the
company.90 Astra had settled sexual harassment claims with at least
eleven employees. 9' One employee told an EEOC investigator that
177. See id.
178. See infra notes 187-205.
179. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1994).
180. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (1994).
181. 42 U.S.C. § 5801 (1994).
182. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1994).
183. See infra notes 187-240 and accompanying text.
184. See Hoffman v. United Telecommunications, Inc., 687 F. Supp. 1512 (D.
Kan. 1988).
185. See infra notes 187-240 and accompanying text.
186. See Hoffman, 687 F. Supp. at 1515.
187. 94 F.3d 738 (lst Cir. 1996).
188. See id. at 739.
189. See Carton & Kerber, supra note 1, at lB.
190. See Astra, 94 F.3d at 740.
191. See id.
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the employee could not disclose relevant information "due to a
confidential settlement agreement that she had entered into with
Astra.", 92 Another employee was reluctant to speak with an EEOC
investigator but would not say whether she and Astra had signed a
settlement agreement. 9  The settlement agreements resemble
each other in that under the agreements:
1. The employee agrees not to file EEOC claims;
2. The employee agrees not to help any employee filing
EEOC claims;
3. The employee releases Astra and its management from
all employment-related claims; and
4. The employee agrees not to disclose information
concerning the employee's EEOC claim and information
concerning the settlement agreement.194
The federal district court enjoined Astra "from entering into
or enforcing provisions of any Settlement Agreements which
prohibit current or former employees from filing charges with the
EEOC and/or assisting the commission in its investigation of any
charges."1 95 The Astra court stated:
In performing that balancing here, we must weigh the
impact of settlement provisions that effectively bar
cooperation with the EEOC on the enforcement of Title
VII against the impact that outlawing such provisions
would have on private dispute resolution.... Clearly, if
victims of or witnesses to sexual harassment are unable to
approach the EEOC or even to answer its questions, the
investigatory powers that Congress conferred would be
sharply curtailed and the efficacy of investigations would
be severely hampered. What is more, the EEOC acts not
only on behalf of private parties but also "to vindicate the
public interest in preventing employment
discrimination." . . . In many cases of widespread
discrimination, victims suffer in silence. In such
instances, a sprinkling of settlement agreements that
192. Id. at 741.
193. See id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 742.
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contain stipulations prohibiting cooperation with the
EEOC could effectively thwart an agency investigation.
96
The court affirmed that portion of the lower court injunction
that allowed current or former employees to assist in EEOC
claims.'"7 Astra had claimed that the assistance portion of the
injunction was unnecessary because the EEOC could obtain the
same information through its subpoena power.' 98 The court
rejected Astra's claim, fearing that allowing the EEOC to gather
information only through subpoena would restrict communication
with the EEOC. The circuit court dissolved that portion of the
lower court injunction which prohibited current or former
employees from filing EEOC charges because there was no
evidence that anyone else wanted to file EEOC charges.200
The court in Hamad v. Graphic Arts Center, Inc.20 r followed Astra.
In Hamad, Taleb Hamad had sued Graphic Arts Center, Inc.
("GAC") "for race and national origin discrimination and for
retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim" under federal
and state statutes.2° Previously, Byron Gruse, a former employee of
GAC, had entered into a settlement agreement with GAC. °3
Hamad had subpoenaed Gruse to appear for a deposition and GAC
moved to quash the subpoena because the settlement agreement
contains confidentiality provisions which would prevent Gruse
204from being deposed. The court concluded "that any provision in
the settlement agreement which prohibits Gruse from testifying as
required by the subpoena are [sic] against public policy and
therefore void."
20 5
206In EEOC v. Cosmair, Inc., Cosmair fired Robert Lee Terry on
March 18, 1986, and three days later Terry signed a release in
which he agreed to release any claims against Cosmair in exchange
196. Id. at 744.
197. See id. at 747.
198. See id. at 745.
199. See id.
200. See id. at 745-46.
201. No. CIV. 96-216-FR, 1997 WL 12955, at *1 (D. Or. Jan. 3, 1997).
202. Id. Hamad had sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 1981 and under an Oregon statute. See id.
203. See id.
204. See id.
205. Id. at *2.
206. 821 F.2d 1085 (5th Cir. 1987).
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for thirty-nine weeks of salary and medical benefits.20 7 On April 7,
1986, Terry filed an EEOC charge under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act. The court held that "an employer and an
employee cannot agree to deny to the EEOC the information it
needs to advance this public interest. A waiver of the right to file a
charge is void as against public policy.
209
• -- 210 . -
In Kalinauskas v. Wong Lin T. Kalinauskas sued Caesars
Palace Hotel & Casino ("Caesars"), her former employer, for
sexual discrimination.21 The prior year, Donna Thomas, another
former Caesars employee had sued for sexual discrimination but
had settled, with the court sealing the confidential settlement
212
agreement. As part of her discovery, Kalinauskas wanted to
depose Thomas.213 The court held that Kalinauskas was entitled to
depose Thomas as long as the deposition did not reveal any
substantive terms of the settlement agreement. 214
In Hoffman v. United Telecommunications, Inc., Phyllis
Hoffman and her former employer had settled Hoffman's
employment discrimination lawsuit in 1987, long after it was
216originally filed . Prior to the settlement, Hoffman had been
217
deposed and had testified concerning her allegations. One
provision of the settlement barred Hoffman, except under
subpoena, from participating in the related class claims that theS 218
EEOC was pursuing. The EEOC asked the court to hold the• . 219
provision unenforceable. The court found that the settlement
207. See id. at 1087.
208. See id.
209. Id. at 1090. The court differentiated between an ADEA (Age
Discrimination in Employment Act) charge and an ADEA cause of action. An
ADEA charge simply communicates information to the EEOC, while an ADEA
cause of action asks that the employee recover against the employer. See id. at
1089. The court stated, "[A]lthough an employee cannot waive the right to file a
charge with the EEOC, the employee can waive not only the right to recover in his
or her own lawsuit but also the right to recover in a suit brought by the EEOC on
the employee's behalf." Id. at 1091.
210. 151 F.R.D. 363 (D. Nev. 1993).
211. See id. at 365.
212. See id.
213. See id.
214. See id. at 367.
215. 687 F. Supp. 1512 (D. Kan. 1988).
216. See id. at 1513.
217. See id.
218. See id.
219. See id.
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provision was not contrary to public policy, especially because the
provision allowed Hoffman to testify under subpoena. The court
stated, "[P] laintiff's interest in recovering monetary compensation
in a private settlement of an employment discrimination lawsuit
that has been pending twelve years outweighs, under the
circumstances of this case, any harm to the public policy that
encourages cooperation in an investigation of the subject
employer. ,221
In Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Secretary of the United States
Department of Labor, John Delcore worked as a general electrical
foreman, supervising subcontracting work at Millstone Nuclear
Power Plant, which was operated by Connecticut Light & Power
Co. ("L&P ).22 After his employer terminated him, Delcore voiced
various allegations to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and
later filed a whistleblower lawsuit against his former employer and
L&P.224 A proposed settlement would have prohibited the former
employee from voluntarily appearing in judicial or administrative
proceedings, would have required the employee to resist
compulsory process, and would have restricted the former
employee's communications with the Nuclear Regulatory
225Commission. The court held that the proposed settlement
agreement violated section 210 of the Energy Reorganization Act
of 1974, "a remedial statute intended to shield employees from
adverse action taken by their employers in response to employees'
complaints of safety violations. "2 2 The court stated, "[T] his kind of
discriminatory action.., can represent a significant threat to the
statutory purpose of ensuring clear lines of communication
between employees and regulatory agencies. 227
In United States v. Northrop Corp.,2s Michael Green, a former
Northrop employee filed a qui tam action against Northrop under229
the False Claims Act. Green claimed that Northrop had double
billed the government and had otherwise violated the False Claims
220. See id. at 1514.
221. Id.
222. 85 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 1996).
223. See id. at 91.
224. See id.
225. See id. at 91 n.1.
226. Id. at 96.
227. Id. at 96 n.5.
228. 59 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 1995).
229. See id. at 956.
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230
Act. Prior to filing suit, Green had settled with Northrop,
agreeing to release all claims and causes of action in exchange for
$190,000. 231 Northrop claimed that Green's lawsuit should be
dismissed because of the prior settlement.232 The court held that it
was against public policy to enforce a release which would have
barred Green from bringing a ui tam claim where United States
did not consent to the release. The court held, "It is critical to
observe... that the government only learned of the allegations of
fraud and conducted its investigation because of the filing of the qui
tam complaint."
23 4
In Chambers v. Capital Cities/ABC235 Robert Chambers sued
Capital Cities for age discrimination under the federal Age
236Discrimination in Employment Act and state law. Chambers had
asked permission to have Chambers' attorney tell former
employees of Capital Cities that they would suffer no adverse
consequences if they disclosed information concerning Capital
Cities even if the disclosures were in violation of any confidentiality
agreement.23 The court refused plaintiff counsel's request but gave
defense counsel the option of notifying former employees in
writing that they could disclose non-confidential information
concerning defendant's "hiring, assignment, and discharge
policies" at a deposition or with defense counsel present.2m If
defense counsel chose not to so notify former employees, the court
could draw an adverse inference.2 39 The court noted:
230. See id.
231. See id.
232. See id. at 957.
233. See id. at 969.
234. Id. at 966. The court further stated, "[B]oth the structure of the Act and
the legislative history reveal that it is the filing of more private suits that Congress
sought to encourage, both to increase enforcement and deterrence as well as to
spur the government to undertake its own investigations." Id.
235. 159 F.R.D. 441 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
236. See Chambers v. Capital Cities/ABC, 851 F. Supp. 543, 544 (S.D.N.Y.
1994).
237. See Chambers, 159 F.R.D. at 445.
238. Id.
239. See id. at 445-46. In dicta, the court stated:
Absent possible extraordinary circumstances not involved here, it is
against public policy for parties to agree not to reveal, at least in the
limited contexts of depositions or pre-deposition interviews concerning
litigation arising under federal law, facts relating to alleged or potential
violations of such law.... To the extent state-law based contracts
interfere unreasonably with federal judicial proceedings under federal
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If applied to depositions or pre-deposition interviewing
with respect to litigation under federal substantive law,
agreements calling or appearing to call for silence
concerning matters relevant to alleged legal violations,
whether or not such agreements are sought to be
enforced, inherently chill communication relevant to the
litigation. Where conduct of a party tends to preclude
availability of information relevant to a litigation and
where no genuine basis for keeping that information
exists, a court or fact-finder may infer that the
information, if disclosed, would be contrary to the
position of the party engaging in such conduct.
III. WHISTLEBLOWING
A. Introduction
Before determining whether there should be a whistleblowing
public policy exception to confidentiality agreements, it is helpful
to examine the reasons for and against allowing whistleblowing. At
the heart of the dilemma is the adversarial relationship among the
employer, the employee and society. The employment at will
doctrine was premised on the employer's need for almost absolute
control in the workplace rather than society's need for information
or the employee's need for workplace security. Under the
employment at will doctrine, the employer has traditionally been
allowed to discharge an employee at will for any reason.
Whistleblowing is a newer approach than the traditional
employment at will doctrine to the complex relationship among
the employer, the employee and society.
Along with the employer's need for workplace control is the
idea that employee whistleblowing undermines the employer's
concerns for productivity, efficiency, and control over employees
and interferes with the employer's right to manage a privateb . 241
business. Whistleblowing leads to unnecessary governmental
substantive law, they are preempted ....
Id. at 444-45.
240. Id. at 445.
241. One scholar calls "efficiency, productivity and profits" the "legitimate
goals of the firm." Rongine, supra note 85, at 284. Other scholars note the
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(judicial) interference with private enterprise. Courts are not
equipped to examine matters of private concern. Whisteblowing
is in direct conflict with the employee's traditional duties of
obedience, loyalty, and confidentiality and weakens necessary-. 243
workplace authority; it may engender conflict among workers
employer's interest in "maximizing control and efficiency." See Terry Morehead
Dworkin & Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Internal Whistleblowing: Protecting the Interests of
the Employee, the Organization, and Society, 29 AM. Bus. L.J. 267, 268 (1991).
Another scholar noted:
[A] legitimate interest of an organization is maintaining its effectiveness.
The effectiveness of an organization depends, at least in part, on a
functioning authority structure. When whistleblowing circumvents the
existing structure of internal responsibility and supervision, it implicitly
criticizes the effectiveness of existing systems of internal control, weakens
the chain of command, and constitutes unpredictable behavior.
Rutzel, supra note 43, at 33 (footnotes omitted).
The amount of protection to be accorded the whistleblower is difficult to
gauge. "Implicit is the belief (perhaps overstated and outdated in today's society)
that an employer should have an unfettered right to run its business as it sees fit
and to select and retain whatever employees it wishes." David Culp, Whistleblowers:
Corporate Anarchists or Heroes? Towards a Judicial Perspective, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J.
109, 131 (1995).
In Dicomes v. State, the Washington Supreme Court found that the
employee's whistleblowing was the result of a difference of opinion and
"unnecessarily interfered with the political and discretionary decision-making
process of her appointed supervisor and ultimately of the Governor." 782 P.2d
1002, 1009 (Wash. 1989).
242. See Sullivan v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 802 F. Supp. 716, 726
(1992). In Sullivan, the court suggests that courts may be cautious in declaring
the contours of a public policy exception to employment at will in the absence of
legislation. See id. at 726; see also Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d
385, 387 - 88 (Conn. 1980); Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625, 630-31
(Haw. 1982).
243. One commentator stated, "Loyalty to one's firm and obedience to one's
superiors are essential components of a successful organization. Absent the
'cement' supplied by these attributes, esprit de corps evaporates, interpersonal
trust fails to develop and the joint pursuit of common goals becomes impossible."
Rongine, supra note 85, at 284, see also Herman v. Western Fin. Corp., 869 P.2d
696, 698 (Kan. 1994) (involving an employee regional mortgage loan operations
manager who had her attorney discuss a violation of the association's
underwriting guidelines with the vice president and general counsel of employer;
on appeal, the court affirmed summary judgment for the employer on employee's
retaliatory discharge claim); Lee v. Denro, Inc., 605 A.2d 1017, 1018 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1992) (affirming the dismissal of a complaint where employee had
protested deviation from testing procedures of communication systems to
employer and, on one occasion, to Federal Aviation Administration inspector;
employee's allegations did not show employer violated any federal statute and
dispute seemed to be a normal employer/employee dispute).
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and between workers and management (loss of trust and
244cooperation).
The employer is also concerned with the additional costs to
the business. Bad publicity results in unjustified loss of goodwill,
sales, and product viability. 45  The cost to investigate
whistleblowing claims is significant. 246 Private sector autonomy and
flexibility are threatened; whistleblowing adds extra unnecessary
procedure and paperwork. Whistleblowing exposes confidential
244. Fellow employees may distance themselves from the whistleblower.
"[R]ather than being viewed with admiration by their peers, whistleblowers are
treated with scorn and disdain and are often rewarded with labels such as 'snitch,'
'rat,' and 'tattletale.'" Culp, supra note 241, at 115. "[W]hisdeblowing may violate
group norms and thereby threaten the cohesiveness and positive working climate
within an organization." Rutzel, supra note 43, at 33 (footnote omitted). In
balancing workplace "harmony and productivity" against statements concerning
the employer's product, harmony and productivity sometimes outweigh
disclosure. See Smith v. Calgon Carbon Corp., 917 F.2d 1338, 1345 (3d Cir. 1990).
For examples of worker and management conflict, see Smith-Pfeffer v.
Superintendent of the Walter E. Ferald State School, 533 N.E.2d 1368, 1370
(Mass. 1989) (reversing, on appeal, a judgment entered on a jury verdict for
employee unit director of state operated facility for the mentally retarded; court
held that dismissal of director because of her opposition to superintendent's
reorganization plan did not violate public policy); Holewinski v. Children's Hosp.,
649 A.2d 712, 713 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (involving a hospital employee who
voiced concern about proposed new head of pediatric nursing to management;
complaint alleging wrongful discharge properly dismissed because not based on
recognized public policy exception).
245. For example, one commentator has noted that "[r]eputation and image
are fragile commodities, and the public not always acts rationally in condemning
activities." Rutzel, supra note 43, at 36. Publicity may have a positive effect where
the company is attempting to suppress a health or safety danger. "Negative
publicity is a potentially effective deterrent to misconduct because it can have a
detrimental impact on credit-worthiness, recruiting, employee morale, sales, and
investors' perceptions." Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin,
Who Blows the Whistle to the Media, and Why: Organizational Characteristics of Media
Whistleblowers, 32 AM. Bus. L.J. 151, 152 (1994) (footnotes omitted).
246. See Rutzel, supra note 43, at 34. Rutzel noted that:
External whistleblowing may lead to additional costs besides those
arising for investigating and correcting the wrongdoing internally.
Government may impose costly measures to prevent further hazards,
may revoke or limit licenses, fine the organization, and hold it liable for
damages. In addition, the organization may lose efficient managers,
either through imprisonment or loss of legal prerequisites necessary to
work in their current capacities, or as a result of public or shareholder
pressure to discharge those perceived to be responsible for the
wrongdoing.
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information and gives competitors an advantage; the employer
loses money spent on research and development of the
confidential information. If trade secrets and confidential
information are considered property, whisfleblowing results in
247taking of property without compensation. Employees discharged
for legitimate reasons may file retributive suits against former
employers. Fear of retributive suits leads employers to screen out
those believed to be potential litigants from being hired as
employees. Tighter screening of potential employees increases
hiring costs. Employers may tend to not hire minorities, fearing
that they will not cooperate with fellow employees.'48
A perceived problem with whistleblowing is that the employee
does not have the judgment to refrain from whistleblowing whenS 249
whistleblowing is not appropnate. The employer fears that
whistleblowing allegations may be false.250 The underachieving
employee may veil poor job performance with threats of
whistleblowing or the disgruntled employee may use
whistleblowing to get even with the employer by submitting
meritless claims.25' The whistleblowing information may concern
247. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
248. See Sullivan v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 802 F. Supp. 716, 726
(1992).
249. See Palmer v. Brown, 752 P.2d 685, 690 (Kan. 1988). A fear is that a
whistleblower may act out of "a corrupt motive such as malice, spite, jealousy or
personal gain." Id.
250. See Culp, supra note 241, at 133-34. Because false whistleblower claims
are costly to the employer, the employee should be sure of the facts before
blowing the whistle. See id. "[F]alse allegations are neither in the interest of the
organization nor of society. False allegations incur investigation costs for both the
employer and the government, and public resources are wasted by binding funds
and manpower in unnecessary investigations or court proceedings." Rutzel, supra
note 43, at 36. Just as costly are claims with insufficient basis. See Stuart v. Beech
Aircraft Corp., 753 F. Supp. 317, 324-25 (D. Kan. 1990), affd, 936 F.2d 584 (10th
Cir. 1991). In Stuart, a senior staff engineer told management of design
disadvantages of starship aircraft, but the court, applying Kansas law, granted the
employer's motion for summary judgment because the engineer's evidence was
insufficient to show he was discharged in retaliation for his design complaints and
his design complaints were thoroughly investigated by employer but rejected. See
id. See also Schriner v. Meginnis Ford Co., 421 N.W.2d 755, 755 (Neb. 1992)
(involving a mechanic who reported an alleged violation of state odometer law to
the Nebraska Attorney General's office). Although Nebraska generally recognizes
a public policy exception to the employment at will doctrine, the Schriner court
held that the employee did not act good faith and refused to find an exception to
the at will doctrine. See id.
251. In Winters v. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., 795 S.W.2d 723 (Tex. 1990)
(Doggett, J., concurring), the concurring justice stated, "Concomitantly, this
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private safety rather than public safety and a private matter rather
252
than a public matter. The employee may be protesting social
policies not affecting public policy rather than public health or253
safety. The employee may choose the least appropriate and most
disruptive manner to whistleblow.254 Employers may be forced to
narrow exception [to employment at will] should protect only honest employees
who follow principles of integrity and social responsibility at the peril of
unemployment, not the disgruntled worker who makes unfounded complaints
against the employer's activities or acts out of less admirable motives such as
spite." Id. at 726. See, e.g., Sanchez v. New Mexican, 738 P.2d 1321, 1322-24 (N.M.
1987) (involving a newspaper employee who claimed he was discharged for
reporting to supervisors his newspaper's alleged failure to pay gross receipts tax
on national advertising accounts. The judgment for the employer was affirmed
because there was sufficient evidence that discharge was not based on employee
whistleblowing).
252. See, e.g., Brown v. Hammond, 810 F. Supp. 644, 647 (E.D. Pa. 1993)
(applying Pennsylvania law; paralegal/secretary disclosed allegedly improper
billing practices of attorney to various authorities and affected clients;
whistieblower count dismissed because it involved no clearly mandated public
policy); Mistishen v. Falcone Piano Co., 630 N.E.2d 294, 295-96 (Mass. App. Ct.
1994) (involving an employee piano technician who reported to employer loose
tuning pins and wrong technique used to tighten pins. The appeals court
affirmed summary judgment for employer because, although employee alleged
violation of statute prohibiting unfair and deceptive practices, employee's
disagreement with employer concerned internal matters); Wright v. Shriners
Hosp. for Crippled Children, 589 N.E.2d 1241, 1243-44 (Mass. 1992) (on appeal,
court reversed judgment for employee nurse holding the there was insufficient
evidence; nurse's critical remarks to a survey team from the national Shriners
organization and a subsequent firing would not have violated public policy
because it was an internal matter); Krajsa v. Keypunch, Inc., 622 A.2d 355, 356
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (involving an employee who claimed that defendants
unlawfully inflated their bills. The employee was fired when he threatened to
report to proper authorities. The trial court ruling affirmed that no action for
wrongful discharge existed because no clear mandate of public policy was
involved).
253. See, e.g., Nichols v. Metropolitan Ctr. for Indep. Living, Inc., 50 F.3d 514,
514 (8th Cir. 1995) (applying Minnesota law; support services coordinator for
center for independent living protested reduction in transportation services to
supervisor and board of directors because the center might cease to be certified
and lose its public funding; whistleblower claim properly dismissed because her
complaint concerned management policies and not a violation of law); Farnam v.
Christa Ministries, 807 P.2d 830, 830 (Wash. 1991) (involving a nurse at a
Christian organization nursing home who objected to the removal of NG tubes
and reported the action to the organization's board of trustees, to the Washington
Department of Social & Health Services, and to the Seattle Times. The jury found
for the nurse and the appellate court reversed denial of the motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict because the organization's actions were legally
protected, did not constitute abuse or neglect, and organization complied with
the Natural Death Act).
254. See Palmateer v. International Harvester, 421 N.E.2d 876, 885 (Ill. 1981)
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retain incompetent workers who have complained for fear of
255
lawsuits if the workers are discharged. Some employees may
desire publicity and whistleblowing to the media may appeal to
simple curiosity and voyeurism rather than the public's need to
know.
On the other hand, society may benefit greatly from
whistleblowing. Whistleblowing can safeguard public health and
safety by 2Nromoting compliance with health and safety
regulations. Internal reporting allows management to correct
problems with less cost to the organization.25 Public policy favors
258citizens who report crimes.The employee also benefits from whistleblowing. Protection
(Ryan, J. dissenting); see also Dicomes v. State, 782 P.2d 1002, 1002 (Wash. 1989)
(involving an executive secretary to the Washington Medical Disciplinary Board
("WMDB") who told her superiors at the Department of Licensing and the chair
of the WMDB that a proposed budget did not include expenditure of surplus
funds. The summary judgment for employer on wrongful discharge claim was
affirmed because the secretary's action interfered with the discretionary decision
making process of her superiors); Schultz v. Industrial Coils, Inc., 373 N.W.2d 74,
74 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985) (involving an employee who wrote a letter to the local
newspaper which was highly critical of her employer and several of the employer's
officers. The appellate court found the employee's actions disruptive and
affirmed summary judgment dismissing employee's action because discharge did
not "contravene a fundamental and well-defined public policy").
255. See Sullivan v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 802 F. Supp. 716, 726
(1992); Rozier v. St. Mary's Hosp., 411 N.E.2d 50, 54 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980).
256. See Rutzel, supra note 43, at 34. Rutzel noted that this is true concerning
environmental whistleblowing. See id. Further, he noted, "Whistleblowing leads
to increased compliance, either voluntary or enforced, without demanding
additional funds for supervision, detection, and evidence gathering." Id.
(footnotes omitted).
257. See Terry Morehead Dworkin & Janet P. Near, Whistleblowing Statutes: Are
They Working?, 25 Am. Bus. L.J. 241, 242 (1987). The commentators noted:
[I] nternal reporting would prevent negative publicity, investigations, and
administrative and legal actions that usually ensue after external
whistleblowing. It also would give the company an opportunity to
prevent other more serious consequences of continued wrongdoing, and
thus to diminish the likelihood of punitive damages for such
wrongdoing. Finally, a proper company response to the internal
whistleblower could also prevent the negative consequences to the work
environment and the whisfleblower that almost inevitably follow external
whistleblowing.
Id.
258. See Parr v. Triplett Corp., 727 F. Supp. 1163, 1166 (N.D. Ill. 1989); Collier
v. Superior Court, 279 Cal. Rptr. 453, 456 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); Palmateer, 421
N.E.2d at 880.
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.... 259
for whistleblowing provides job security, improves job
satisfaction,260 encourages ethical behavior,26' and allows the
262employee to provide input in the workplace. Whistleblowing
regulation encourages whisfleblowing and prevents social rejection
of the whistleblower. The media is a key outlet where internal
whistleblowing has been ineffective and no governmental agency
regulates the industry, because the media can protect the
whistleblower. External reporting to media is influential in
causing change, and the media provides an independent
investigation of the alleged wrongdoing; the investigation enhances
the credibility of the whistleblower's disclosure.26
Whistleblowing is beneficial to the organization as well.
Internal reporting allows management to address problems in their
incipiency with less cost to the organization, preventing continued
265wrongdoing and avoiding lawsuits. Internal whisdieblowing
safeguards the organization's goodwill. The threat of possible
government intervention may encourage the organization to act
ethically. The threat of whistleblowing may deter wrongdoing by
the organization or management. Internal reporting may forewarn
the organization and enable it to successfully deal with adverse
publicity.266  Responsiveness to internal whistleblowing reduces
adverse reaction by management and coworkers. Internal
267whistleblowing is an efficient source of feedback. Whistleblowing
259. See Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625, 631 (Haw. 1982).
260. See id.
261. See id.
262. See Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 241, at 281, 300-02. Courts have
encouraged internal reporting of health and safety concerns by employees. See id.
Employees may desire to eliminate wrongdoing in the workplace and can provide
input to the employer in making any necessary change. Another commentator
stated, "[A]Ithough internal whistleblowing may disturb the working climate, it
may enhance it by pacifying a workforce, increasing feelings of security, and by
encouraging ethical behavior." Rutzel, supra note 43, at 33.
263. In his concurring opinion in Winters, Justice Doggett stated, "Often the
very act of whistleblowing indicates that government regulation has been
inadequate to protect the public." Winters v. Houston Chronicle Publ'g Co., 795
S.W.2d 723, 728 (Tex. 1990).
264. See Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 85, at 390-93.
265. Many Fortune 500 companies view whistleblowing as positive.
Approximately half have a toll-free number that employees may use to
anonymously report wrongdoing. See Ellen Neuborne, Whistle-blowers Pipe Up More
Frequently, USA TODAY, July 22, 1996, at 2B; see also Culp, supra note 241, at 132;
Dworkin & Near, supra note 257, at 242; Rutzel, supra note 43, at 33.
266. See Dworkin & Near, supra note 257, at 300.
267. See Winters, 795 S.W.2d at 728-29 (Doggett, J., concurring) ("Employees
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promotes organizational loyalty if the information is welcomed,
and whistleblowing often comes from long-time employees.'
68
Internal whistleblowing allows management to correct any lack of
knowledge of the employee or explain a difference in social
•• 269
policy.
B. Whistleblowing under State Law
The question is whether a confidentiality agreement that
shields from disclosure illegal acts or public health and safety risks
is contrary to public policy. This question arises against a
background of state whistleblowing statutes and cases finding a
public policy whistleblowing exception to the employment at will
doctrine. At least forty-one states protect whistleblowers through
statutes.270 The statutory protection varies from states to state, with
are the first to learn of activities in the workplace that may have an adverse effect
upon the public and are in the best position to bring to a halt threatening
conduct before irreversible damage is done.").
268. See Dworkin & Near, supra note 257, at 303-04 n.200.
269. See id. at 243. The commentators noted:
In some cases the whistleblowing may not concern actual wrongdoing
but may simply reflect the employee's ignorance about the
organization's actions or a difference in opinion as to ethical standards.
This is one reason for executives to prefer internal whistleblowing: they
may learn of disagreements about ethical standards-and have the
chance to clarify these-before the complaint of wrongdoing is made
public. In addition, top executives may actually be unaware of
wrongdoing committed by subordinates; internal complaints give them a
chance to stop the wrongdoing before it is made public knowledge.
Id.
270. State whistleblowing statutes include: ALASKA STAT. §§ 39.90.100 to
39.90.150 (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1994); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-531 to 38-534
(West Supp. 1994); CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1102.5 to 1106 (West 1995); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 24-50.5-101 to 24-50.5-107 (West 1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§31-51m (West Supp. 1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 5115 (Michie 1994); FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 112.3187 to 112.3195 (West 1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 45-1-4 (Michie
1994); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 378-61 to 378-69 (Michie 1994 & Supp. 1996); ILL.
STAT. ANN. §§ 395/0.01 to 395/1 (Smith-Hurd 1995); IND. CODE ANN. § 20-12-1-8,
§ 4-15-10-4 (West 1991 & Supp. 1992); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 79A.28 to 79A.29 (West
1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-2973 (1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 61.101 to 61.103
(Michie 1994); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 30:2027 (West 1994); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 26, §§ 831 to 840 (West 1994 & Supp. 1996); MD. CODE ANN., Com. Law II, §§
3-301 to 3-310 (Michie 1994); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 149, § 185 (West 1994);
MICH. COMp. LAws ANN. §§ 15.361 to 15.369 (West 1994); MINN. STAT. §§ 181.931
to 181.937 (1998); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 105.055 (West 1994); MONT. CODE ANN. §§
39-2-901 to 39-2-915 (1993); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 281.611 to 281.671 (Michie
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some whistleblowing statutes applying only to public employees
and others covering private employees. The type of information
about which a whistle may be blown also varies. The majority of
state statutes protect whistleblowing that discloses a violation of
federal, state, or local law. Other state statutes are more
restrictive. 7'
A steadily growing body of case law concerns the
whistleblowing public policy exception to the employment at will
doctrine. Under the employment at will doctrine, the employer
had traditionally been allowed to discharge an employee at will for
272
any reason. In 1959, California became the first state to create a
273
public policy exception to the employment at will doctrine. Now
recognized in a majority of states, the public policy exception
274
generally applies to four types of cases. The first three types of
cases protect the employee discharged for performing a public
obligation, for exercising a statutory right, and for refusing to
perform an illegal or unethical act. The fourth type of case
recognizes a public policy exception to the employment at will
doctrine for whistleblowing.2
76
1993); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 275-E:1 to 275-E:7 (Michie Supp. 1992); N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 34:19-1 to 34:19-8 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-9-25
(Michie 1994); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740 (McKinney 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 126-84
to 126-88 (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1994); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4413.51 to
4413.53 (West 1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, §§ 840-1.1 to 840-1.4 (West 1994);
ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 659.505 to 659.545 (1994); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1421 to
1428 (West 1994); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 28-50-1 to 28-50-9 (Michie 1994); S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 8-27-10 to 8-27-50 (Law. Co-op. 1994); S.D. CODIFED LAws ANN. §§ 3-6A-
52, 60-11-17 to 60-11-17.1 (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1994); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-
304 (Michie 1991); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.5, §§ 554.001 to 554.010 (West
Supp. 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 67-21-1 to 67-21-9 (Michie 1994); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 42.40.010-.900, 42.41.010 (West 1994); W. VA. CODE §§ 6C-1-1 to 6C-
1-8 (Michie 1994); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 230.80 to 230.89 (West 1994).
271. See Rutzel, supra note 43, at 26.
272. See Christopher L. Pennington, Comment, The Public Policy Exception to the
Employment-at-will Doctrine: Its Inconsistencies in Application, 68 TUL. L. REv. 1583,
1593 (1994).
273. See id. (citing Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959)).
274. See Elletta Sangrey Callahan, The Public Policy Exception to the Employment at
Will Rule Comes of Age: A Proposed Framework for Analysis, 29 AM. Bus. L.J. 481, 485
(1991).
275. See id. at 486.
276. See id at 485; see generally Frank J. Cavico, Employment at Will and Public
Policy, 25 AKRON L. REv. 497 (1992); Mark A. Fahleson, The Public Policy Exception to
Employment at Will-When Should Courts Defer to the Legislature?, 72 NEB. L. REv. 956
(1993); Venessa F. Kuhlmann-Macro, Note, Blowing the Whistle on the Employment at-
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The employment relationship is a continuum with just cause
termination at one end and strict employment at will with no
public policy exception at the other end. Most states have
recognized that strict employment at will is too harsh and have
tried to find a middle course allowing an exception where there is
a clear violation of public policy."' Cases recognizing a
whistleblowing public policy exception to the employment at will
doctrine contain reasoning which may profitably be reviewed as
one starting point in fashioning a whistleblowing public policy
278exception to confidentiality agreements. In most cases, the court
requires that the information sought to be disclosed must affect
public (not private) interests of health or safety, or must concern
illegal conduct. 79
The "public" in public policy suggests that courts deciding
whistleblowing cases should differentiate between, on one hand,
whistleblowing affecting an interest of society and, on the other
hand, whistleblowing affecting a "private" interest of the employer
and employee. One author suggests that this distinction is
"treacherous at best, and more than likely incoherent."2s° The
California Supreme court opined, "'public policy' as a concept is
notoriously resistant to precise definition. "  Courts faced with
whistleblowing cases have found this a difficult distinction to
make. 2
Several courts have concluded that whistleblowing was not
warranted because it affected a private rather than a public
interest; this is so even though the whistleblowing had at least a
will Doctrine, 41 DRAKE L. REV. 339 (1992); Brock Rowatt, Comment, The Public
Policy Exception to Employment at Will: Can Judicial Decisions be Used as a Source of
Public Policy ?, 62 UMKC L. REV. 325 (1993).
277. See infra notes 284-90.
278. See id.
279. See id.
280. Stewart J. Schwab, Wrongful Discharge Law and the Search for Third-party
Effects, 74 TEx. L. REv. 1943, 1944-45 (1996).
281. Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d 680, 687 (Cal. 1992). The court noted,
"The difficulty, of course, lies in determining where and how to draw the line
between claims that genuinely involve matters of public policy, and those that
concern merely ordinary disputes between employer and employee." Id. at 684.
The court further observed, "A public policy exception carefully tethered to
fundamental policies that are delineated in constitutional or statutory provisions
strikes the proper balance among the interests of employers, employees and the
public." Id. at 688.
282. See infra notes 284-90.
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tenuous connection to a public interest. 18 For example, a New
Jersey appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment for the
employer where the employer disputed the employee's claim that
elevated liver enzyme readings of patients participating in a new
drug study should have been reported immediately to the FDA.
8 4
The court characterized the dispute as "a difference of professional
opinion." 2s5  In another New Jersey case, the company vice
president recommended the employee's termination for business
reasons and the employee contended he was terminated for
opposing the company's distribution of contaminated tooth
286paste. On appeal, the court affirmed the summary judgment
granted to the employer because no wrongful discharge claim was
recognized for an employee voicing opposition to corporate
policy. The court viewed the complaint as solely internal, with
the employee not trained to determine whether the product was
288contaminated. In a New Mexico case, an employee reported to
289
the employer that the store manager was using illegal drugs.
283. See infra notes 284-90.
284. See Chelly v. Knoll Pharms., 685 A.2d 498, 503-05 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1996).
285. Id. at 505. The court noted that:
[A] difference of professional opinion between an employee and those
with the corporate decision making power is not a sufficient basis for a
wrongful discharge cause of action.... This is so even though the
dispute arises from the employee's well-intended and conscientious
concern for potential harm to those who might be affected by the
corporate conduct of which the employee objects.
The pertinent federal regulations simply do not require the
immediate reporting espoused by plaintiff of that type of speculative
harm.
Id.
286. See House v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 556 A.2d 353, 354 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1989).
287. See id. at 355.
288. See id. at 356-57.
289. See Garrity v. Overland Sheepskin Co., 917 P.2d 1382, 1389 (N.M. 1996).
The court noted that:
This case does not involve an employee in a profession for which drug
use would pose an immediate, identifiable risk to the public.... Nor
does the case involve an economic crime that directly injures the general
public and that an employer can remedy immediately if made aware of
the problem ....
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The New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed the directed verdict for
the employer because, although there was a clear mandate of
public policy, the reporting of alleged drug use primarily benefited
290the employer and the employee rather than the public.
Positive law regulates countless aspects of the employer-
employee relationship; the pervasiveness of this regulation
indicates that the employer-employee relationship is already a
matter of public concern. One might argue that court decisions
determining the outlines of the public policy exception, such as
the three cases described in the preceding paragraph, have public
interest attached to them; this is so whether a particular court
decides that the incident in the instant case does or does not fall
within the public policy exception. Viewed from an economic
perspective, all employment decisions affect the economy which in
turn affects the public. One solution to the difficulty in separating
public interests from private interests and finding a source in
positive law is to limit employee terminations to those supported by
just cause.29' A solution at the opposite end of the spectrum is to
refuse to recognize any common law public policy exception to
employment at will. This solution is adhered to by a handful of
states.
At least twenty-six states recognize a common law public policy
exception for whistleblowing. These twenty six states are Alaska,
294 2 C 296 . 297Arizona, Arkansas, 29  California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Id.
290. See id.
291. See Note, Protecting Employees at Will Against Wrongful Discharge: the Public
Policy Exception, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1931, 1950 (1983).
292. See Schwab, supra note 280, at 1943. According to Schwab, the handful of
states are New York, Georgia, Louisiana, and Mississippi. See id. at 1943 n.4.
293. See Knight v. American Guard & Alert, Inc., 714 P.2d 788, 792 (Alaska
1986) (recognizing that an action for breach of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing is enforceable, and although public policy theory is largely
incorporated within the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the appellate
court could not determine whether public policy theory applied on the facts).
294. See Wagner v. City of Globe, 722 P.2d 250, 257 (Ariz. 1986) (en banc).
295. See Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 743 S.W.2d 380, 385 (Ark. 1988)
(recognizing a contract action for wrongful discharge for reporting a violation of
state or federal law).
296. See Rocky Mountain Hosp. & Med. Serv. v. Mariani, 916 P.2d 519, 527
(Colo. 1996).
297. See Girgenti v. Cali-Con, Inc., 544 A.2d 655, 659 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988);
Schmidt v. Yardney Elec. Corp., 492 A.2d 512, 515-16 (Conn. App. Ct. 1985).
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Hawaii,29 s Illinois,29  Kansas, 00  Kentucky,3 01  Maryland, 3 02
303 104 305 s06 307Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada,
308 309 310 311 312New Jersey, New Mexico, s° 1 Ohio, 3 1 Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Washington, and West• • . 317 318 • • • 319
Virginia. A few states and the District of Columbia do not
298. See Norris v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 842 P.2d 634, 646 (Haw. 1992), affd,
512 U.S. 246 (1994). In this case an aircraft mechanic refused to certify an
aircraft repair as requested by his supervisor and reported the problem to the
Federal Aviation Authority. See id. at 638. The Hawaii Whistleblower's Protection
Act was intended to protect an employee who whistle blows for the public good
and the public policy of the Federal Aviation Act and federal aviation regulations
is to protect the public from shoddy aircraft repair. See id. at 646; see also Parnar v.
Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625, 631 (Haw. 1982).
299. SeePalmateerv. International Harvester, 421 N.E.2d 876, 877 (Ill. 1981).
300. See Meyer v. Allen Freight Lines, Inc., 885 P.2d 391, 393 (Kan. Ct. App.
1994).
301. See Brown v. Physicians Mut. Ins. Co., 679 S.W.2d 836, 838 (Ky. Ct. App.
1987).
302. See Adler v. American Standard Corp. 432 A.2d 464, 471 (Md. 1981).
303. See Mello v. The Stop & Shop Cos., Inc., 524 N.E.2d 105, 106 (Mass.
1988).
304. See Nichols v. Metropolitan Ctr. For Indep. Living, Inc., 50 F.3d 514, 516
(8th Cir. 1995) (applying Minnesota law).
305. See Olinger v. General Heating & Cooling Co., 896 S.W.2d 43, 48 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1994).
306. See Schriner v. Meginnis Ford Co., 421 N.W.2d 755, 759 (Neb. 1988).
307. SeeD'Angelo v. Gardner, 819 P.2d 206, 215-16 (Nev. 1991).
308. See Potter v. Village Bank, 543 A.2d 80, 85 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1988); Lepore v. National Tool & Mfg. Co., 540 A.2d 1296, 1300 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1988), affid, 557 A.2d 1371 (N.J. 1989).
309. See Gandy v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 872 P.2d 859, 860 (N.M. 1994).
310. See Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc., 677 N.E.2d 308, 319 (Ohio 1997).
311. See Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 770 P.2d 24, 28 (Okla. 1989).
312. See Dalby v. Sisters of Providence in Oregon, 865 P.2d 391, 394 (Or. Ct.
App. 1993).
313. See Hunger v. Grand Cent. Sanitation, 670 A.2d 173, 175-77 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1996).
314. See Cummins v. EG & G Sealol, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 134, 136 (D.R.I. 1988).
315. See Thompson v. El Centro Del Barrio, 905 S.W.2d 356, 358 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1995).
316. See Shaw v. Housing Auth., 880 P.2d 1006, 1009 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994).
317. See Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270, 275 (W. Va. 1978).
318. Those states are Indiana, North Carolina, South Dakota, and Wisconsin.
For Indiana, see Campbell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 413 N.E.2d 1054, 1056 (Ind. Ct. App.
1980) (affirming summary judgment for employer where a pharmaceutical
research team member had been terminated after reporting acts of misconduct
by his superiors and questioning the safety of some drugs). In Campbell, the court
noted that a "plaintiff must demonstrate that he was discharged in retaliation for
either having exercised a statutorily conferred personal right or having fulfilled a
statutorily imposed duty." Id.
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recognize a whistleblowing public policy exception to employment
at will.
As with state whistleblowing statutes, the contours of the
exception vary widely. Those states recognizing the exception
generally protect whistleblowing if the disclosure involves the
violation of a constitutional provision, or of statutes, rules or
320 321regnlations. For example, in a Connecticut case, the plaintiff,
who had been quality control director and operations manager,
could have been prosecuted for violating the Connecticut Uniform
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act if he had not reported "substandard
raw materials and underweight components" to his employer. 
'
2
The Connecticut Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in
323 324
striking plaintiff's complaint. In an Illinois case, the court
pointed to the Illinois Constitution and the federal Occupational
Safety and Health Act as two sources of public policy. 32 5 In this
case, an employee was discharged after reporting to the employer
safety representative that the employee had found deteriorating
insulation in his work area that was suspected of containing
For North Carolina, see Haburjak v. Prudential Bache Secs., Inc., 759 F.
Supp. 293, 300 (W.D.N.C. 1991) (applying North Carolina law). In Haburjak, a
stockbroker was discharged for reporting to her employer's manager insider
trading by brokerage employees. See id. at 294. The court found that the public
policy exception is limited to a situation where the employer affirmatively
instructs the employee to violate the law. See id. at 300.
For South Dakota, see Peterson v. Glory House, 443 N.W.2d 653, 654-55
(S.D. 1989) (stating that the only public policy exception to the employment at
will doctrine is for termination for refusal to commit a criminal or unlawful act).
For Wisconsin, see Hausman v. St. Croix Care Ctr., Inc., 558 N.W.2d 893,
897 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that a whistleblower exception to the
employment at will doctrine "has not been recognized in Wisconsin and is an
issue that must be addressed by the supreme court or the legislature").
319. See Thigpen v. Greenpeace, Inc., 657 A.2d 770, 771 (D.C. 1995) (refusing
the argument that the court should expand the public policy exception beyond
an employee's refusal to violate law); Gray v. Citizens Bank, 602 A.2d 1096, 1097
(D.C. 1992) (involving an employee who was allegedly discharged for reporting a
fellow employees' illegal activities to employer. The dismissal of the action for
wrongful discharge was affirmed with the court stating that the public policy
exception does extend beyond an employee refusal to violate law).
320. See supra notes 293-317.
321. Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385, 388 (Conn. 1980).
322. See id. at 388-89.
323. See id. at 389.
324. See Sherman v. Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc., 651 N.E.2d 708, 712 (Ill. App. Ct.
1995).
325. See id.
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316
asbestos. On appeal, the court reversed the trial court's dismissal
of the employee's complaint, concluding that the employee
"sufficiently pleaded his discharge violated the clearly mandated
public policy preventing the discharge of employees for reporting
occupational health hazards."
3
2
7 In a second case from Illinois, 3
the employer's chief engineer reported a claimed fire hazard in an
apartment building to the building manager and the City.3 2 The... . . 330
engineer claimed he was fired in retaliation. The appellate court
reversed the trial court's dismissal of the retaliatory discharge
331 . 332claim. In a Missouri case, employees at a fireworks production
factory reported unsafe working conditions to their employer and
333to the United States Department of Labor. On appeal, the court
reversed the trial court's dismissal of the action, finding that the
Missouri public policy exception to the employment at will
doctrine did apply to the retaliatory discharge of employees for
reporting Occupational Safety and Health Act violations.33 In an
335Oregon case, a nursing director was fired for threatening to
report patient mistreatment by the nursing home administrator to
the state agency responsible for enforcing the Oregon Nursing
136Home Patient's Bill of Rights. The appellate court found that
the trial court had erred in instructing the jury that the plaintiff
had to prove patient abuse, holding that "an employee is protected
from discharge for good faith reporting of what the employee
believes to be patient mistreatment to an appropriate authority."3
In another Oregon case,33" an employee maintenance worker
reported dangerous conditions and potential physical abuse at a
residential care center for the mentally disabled to the Oregon
326. See id. at 709.
327. Id. at 713.
328. See Prince v. Rescorp Realty, 940 F.2d 1104, 1105 (7th Cir. 1991).
329. See id.
330. See id.
331. See id. at 1110.
332. See Shawcross v. Pyro Prods., Inc., 916 S.W.2d 342, 343 (Mo. Ct. App.
1995).
333. See id.
334. See id. at 344-46.
335. See McQuary v. Bel Air Convalescent Home, 684 P.2d 21, 22-23 (Or. Ct.
App. 1984).
336. See id.
337. Id. at 24.
338. See Hirsovescu v. Shangri-La Corp., 831 P.2d 73, 75 (Or. Ct. App. 1992).
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Mental Health and Developmental Disability Services Division.
The division was a state agency responsible for reviewing the
center's compliance with state and federal law.34 On appeal, the
court affirmed the jury verdict for the worker on the wrongful
discharge claim.34i
Illinois, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania are among the
twenty-six states recognizing a public policy exception to
employment at will.3 Even so, these states have not recognized an
exception, in certain cases, even though a positive law basis existed.
Illinois courts have decided a handful of such cases. In a 1984343
Illinois case, the court dismissed a lawsuit in which the flight
engineer had sued for wrongful discharge for reporting violations
of Federal Aviation Authority aircraft maintenance regulations.
In a 1987 Illinois case, 345 the state did not allow a public policy
exception for whistleblowing even for violation of the Illinois
insurance code because the injury was economic and did not
"strike at the heart of a citizen's social rights, duties and
responsibilities."3" In another Illinois case,347 in-house counsel had
informed the company president that defective dialyzers shipped to
it by its parent company would have to be reported to the FDA.348
The attorney made the report to the FDA after he was
terminated . 4  The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed a summary
judgment for the company because extending the tort of
retaliatory discharge to an in-house counsel might chill attorney-
client communication, the in-house counsel had to report the
defective dialyzers under the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct
or resign, the client has a right to discharge an attorney, and the in-
house counsel was acting as an attorney rather than as a layperson
339. See id.
340. See id.
341. See id. at 74.
342. See supra notes 293-317.
343. See Rachford v. Evergreen Int'l Airlines, Inc., 596 F. Supp. 384, 385 (N.D.
Ill. 1984).
344. See id. at 386.
345. See Fowler v. Great Am. Ins. Cos., 653 F. Supp. 692, 692 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
346. Id. In Fowler, an insurance company supervisor was allegedly terminated
for complying with provisions of the Illinois insurance code. See id. The court
dismissed the claim because the insurance code was not sufficiently tied to public
safety but was tied to the state's socio-economic objectives. See id. at 699.
347. SeeBalla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104, 106-10 (Ill. 1991).
348. See id.
349. See id.
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in the incident.5 ° In 1996, an Illinois court affirmed a motion to
dismiss granted to the employer furniture manufacturer where the
employee had advised the employer that it was violating Interstate
Commerce Commission regulations requiring written contracts
with interstate contract carriers.1
51
One Missouri court questioned whether all Federal Aviation
Authority regulations were a source of public policy:
3 5 2
While we assume generally that regulations governing
federal aviation safety are very important, and will often
relate to a clear mandate of public policy, we cannot say
that every federal "safety regulation" involves such a clear
mandate.... The FAA's regulation concerning a pilot's
responsibility and the "Code of Ethics" requirement that a
pilot use his best judgment are not clear mandates which
allow employees to fall within the public policy
exception.... Vague regulations may not be sufficiently
clear to make enforcement practicable through
employment-related litigation. Those regulations not
related to safety may have less significant public policy
implications than those related to safety. 53
In a 1995 case, the Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled that a
restaurant employee had no cause of action for wrongful discharge
for reporting embezzlement by a fellow employee because the
reported activity was proprietary and private to the employer rather
than directly affecting the interests of the general public.
A 1996 Pennsylvania case involved the employee safety
director "becoming aware" that blasting caps were being deposited
into garbage containers at the business of one of the employer's
350. See id.
351. See Leweling v. Schnadig Corp., 657 N.E.2d 1107, 1114 (Ill. App. Ct.
1995).
352. See Adolphsen v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 907 S.W.2d 333, 337-38 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1995).
353. Id. In Adolphsen, after the employee co-pilot/mechanic reported a
violation of Federal Aviation Authority safety regulations to his supervisor and
then to the employer chief executive officer, the employee's supervisors allegedly
harassed him into resigning. See id. On appeal, the court vacated the trial court's
dismissal of the employee's petition and remanded to allow the employee to
amend the petition to state a specific violation of FAA regulations reflecting a
clear mandate of public policy. See id. at 339.
354. See Hayes v. Eateries, Inc., 905 P.2d 778, 788-90 (Okla. 1995).
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customers. The employee informed the employer's owner and
state and local police but when the state police and the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms searched the garbage containers
no hazardous materials were found.356  On appeal, the court
affirmed summary judgment for the employer because the
employee was not under a duty to report and his actions were
"overzealous."3 57 The court stated:
To state a public policy exception to the at-will-
employment doctrine, the employee must point to a clear
public policy articulated in the constitution, in legislation,
an administrative regulation, or a judicial decision....
Furthermore, the stated mandate of public policy, as
articulated in the constitution, statute, or judicial
decision, must be applicable directly to the employee and
the employee's actions.... We have recognized a public
policy exce tion only in extremely limited
circumstances.
At least a few states of the twenty-six have decided that public
policy does not necessarily need to be reflected in a constitutional
provision, statute, rule, or regulation for the public policy
exception to apply.359 The Arizona Supreme Court has recognized
that public policy need not have a statutory basis,36 as has a Kansas361
court. The Arizona Supreme Court stated:
355. See Hunger v. Grand Cent. Sanitation, 670 A.2d 173, 174-75 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1996).
356. See id.
357. See id. at 176-77.
358. Id. at 175-76.
359. See infra notes 360-70 and accompanying text.
360. See Wagner v. City of Globe, 722 P.2d 250, 252 (Ariz. 1986). In Wagner, a
police officer brought to the judge's attention that the arrest of the individual was
illegal and the arrestee had been detained eleven days more than the original
sentence. See id. The officer was fired and protested the termination to the city
council. See id. On appeal from summary judgment for defendant, the court
found that summary judgment on the wrongful discharge claim was improper and
stated that protecting civil rights of citizens from abuse furthers public policy. See
id. at 256.
.361. See Pilcher v. Board of County Comm'rs, 787 P.2d 1204, 1209 (Kan. Ct.
App. 1990) (directing verdict for defendant was erroneous where county
employee claimed she was wrongfully discharged because she was believed to be
the source of information on the county's "unsavory and untenable hiring
practices" that were the basis of a newspaper article). The court noted:
[Vol. 25
52
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 14
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol25/iss2/14
AT WHAT PRICE SILENCE
So long as employees' actions are not merely private or
proprietary, but instead seek to further the public good,
the decision to expose illegal or unsafe practices should
be encouraged. We recognize that there is a tension
between the obvious societal benefits in having employees
with access to information expose activities which may be
illegal or which may jeopardize health and safety, and
accepted concepts of employee loyalty .... [N] evertheless
we conclude that on balance actions which enhance the
enforcement of our laws or expose unsafe conditions, or
otherwise serve some singularly public purpose, will inure
to the benefit of the public.... The relevant inquiry is not
limited to whether any particular law or regulation has
been violated, although that may be important, but
instead emphasizes whether some "important public
policy interest embodied in the law" has been furthered
by the whistleblowing activity.3
62
Some states recognize professional ethic rules as the basis for
the exception. 36  The California Supreme Court has held that
public policy to support a claim could be found in an attorney
ethics rule mandating the action taken by the attorney or in an
attorney ethics rule permitting attorney action so long as an
exception to attorney client confidentiality allowed the action.'6
The Colorado Supreme Court has allowed the Colorado State
Board of Accountancy Rules and Regulations as a source of public
The Palmer decision discusses discharging an employee for reporting a
violation of the law pertaining to public health, safety, and the general
welfare. We do not believe that those areas are exclusive in proving a
claim for retaliatory discharge. If the matters reported in the Kansas City
Times were true.., the county was engaging in very questionable hiring
practices which ultimately would have a detrimental effect on the
general welfare of the taxpayers of Wyandotte County.
Id. at 1210; see also Palmer v. Brown, 752 P.2d 685, 685 (Kan. 1988) (involving a
laboratory head who reported suspicions of Medicaid fraud to authorities. The
court reversed the dismissal of the complaint as to the retaliatory discharge
because termination for the good faith reporting of a serious infraction of the law
concerning health, safety, or welfare is actionable).
362. Wagner, 722 P.2d at 757.
363. See infra notes 364-66.
364. See General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 504 (Cal.
1994).
1999]
53
Bast: At What Price Silence: Are Confidentiality Agreements Enforceable
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1999
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
policy. 365 A New Jersey court has allowed the pharmacist code of
ethics as a source of public policy.1
66
The public policy exception is directed to actions originating
within the employer-employee relationship which have an effect on
third parties. A number of courts seem to search for a public
policy basis in positive law as a substitute for considering the effect
of employee action on third parties outside the employment
relationship; the underlying reason for the search for positive law is
that embodiment in positive law protects the courts from criticism
for trespassing into the province of the legislature. One might
revisit the various court decisions involving employee
whistleblowing. The majority of states set the standard for
determining whether the information is of "whistleblowing quality"
367as the violation of a particular statute. A number of states require
that public policy be embodied in positive law-primarily
constitutions and statutes, but some states have allowed the public
policy exception to be based on administrative regulations, codes
of ethics and judicial .e.sins
365. See Rocky Mountain Hosp. & Med. Serv. v. Mariani, 916 P.2d 519, 525
(Colo. 1996). On appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court agreed with the Colorado
Court of Appeals that a directed verdict for the employer should be reversed
where the employee accountant was discharged after reporting accounting
practices to her supervisors. See id. at 528. The court further noted that:
[In order] to qualify as public policy, the ethical provision must be
designed to serve the interests of the public rather than the interests of
the profession. The provision may not concern mere technical matters
or administrative regulations. In addition, the provision must provide a
clear mandate to act or not to act in a particular way. Finally, the
viability of ethical codes as a source of public policy must depend on a
balancing between the public interest served by the professional code
and the need of an employer to make legitimate business decisions....
Thus, we hold that professional ethical codes may in certain
circumstances be a source of public policy. However, we emphasize that
any public policy must serve the public interest and be sufficiently
concrete to notify employers and employees of the behavior it requires.
Id. at 525.
366. See Kalman v. Grand Union Co., 443 A.2d 728, 731 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1982) (holding that where a pharmacist ordered by her employer to close the
pharmacy section of a store on July 4, instead complied with the state Board of
Pharmacy and kept pharmacy open, that summary judgment for employer is
reversed where employer's order would have violated state statute, state
administrative rules and the pharmacist code of ethics).
367. See supra notes 297-341 and accompanying text.
368. See supra notes 364-66 and accompanying text.
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Most states have chosen a middle ground between allowing
employee termination only forjust cause and refusing to recognize
any public policy exception to employment at will. The public
versus private distinction is most problematic in those states whose
public policy exception is narrow and where courts have allowed
the exception only if found in a constitution or a state statute.
Public policy does not include a technical violation of a statute but
should include more than the statute, especially when there is an
imminent and substantial harm to a third party. A statute makes it
relatively easy to draw the line, but there are instances in which an
imminent and substantial risk to public health or safety is not
covered by a statute. Using state statutes and constitutional
provisions as the sole basis for the public policy exception is a
shortcut that can lead to unjust results. On one hand, employee
whistleblowing which discloses substantial safety or health risks to
the public should fall within the public policy exception even
though the disclosure was not based on a public policy interest
embodied in a state statute. On the other hand, employee
whistleblowing which discloses a minor statutory violation not
affecting public health or safety or any other fundamental interest
may not be the type of disclosure which the public policy exception
should protect.
The standard that information disclosed by whistleblowing
concern the violation of a particular statute is both underinclusive
and overinclusive. If the benchmark for allowing whistleblowing is
harm to the public, it is illogical for a court to refuse to protect
whistleblowing merely because the public policy is not directly
reflected in legislative enactment. For example, an Illinois court
refused to protect disclosure of alleged safety and security
violations at a nuclear plant where the statute which would have
protected the disclosure was not yet in effect when the disclosure
occurred;369 a West Virginia court refused to protect an airline
employee who reported an alleged safety violation where the
reported evidence supported a violation of federal rather than state
369. See McKay v. Pinkerton's Inc., 607 N.E.2d 237, 242 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
In this case, a security guard at a nuclear power plant reported alleged safety and
security violations to the plant owner. See id. at 239. On appeal after the motion
to dismiss was granted in favor of defendants, the court held that there was no
cause of action for wrongful discharge where the statute protecting employees
who report nuclear hazards was not in effect until after the guard was terminated
and there was no other clearly mandated public policy. See id. at 240.
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law.170  Exclusive reliance on legislative enactment is illogical
because there are various reasons for the legislature not to act.
Victims may not be protected by legislation where they do not have
a strong lobby in the legislature; two historically under-represented
categories of potential victims are children and minorities. The
legislature may not have dealt with a problem for lack of time in
the legislative session or because the problem is such a new one
that it has not come to the legislature's attention.
C. Wigand as Whistleblower
Some would claim that in the past four years, the news media
has been painting an unrealistic picture in black and white, making
Wigand out to be something of a hero.37 ' B&W has accused CBS of
370. See Trifle v. Crown Airways, Inc., 751 F. Supp. 585, 586 (S.D. W. Va.
1989), affd, 928 F.2d 81 (4th Cir. 1990) (applying West Virginia law). The
opposite result was reached in a case from Hawaii. See Norris v. Hawaiian Airlines,
Inc., 842 P.2d 634, 646 (Haw. 1992), affd, 512 U.S. 246 (1994).
371. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text. The following are additional
examples of how Wigand is treated favorably, both in comments made about him
by the media and in the number of positive quotations about him included in the
media. Mike Wallace asked about Wigand's reactions to his whistleblowing in a 60
Minutes interview. See 60 Minutes-Profile: Jeffrey Wigand, Ph.D.; Jeffrey Wigand
Discloses Information on Brown & Williamson and Attempts Are Made to Rebut the Claims
(CBS television broadcast, June 22, 1997), available in 1997 WL 7900021. Wallace
asked Wigand, "You wish you hadn't blown the whistle?" Id. Wigand responded:
There are times I wish I hadn't done it, but there are times that I feel
compelled to do it. I-if you ask me if I would do it again or if it--do I
think it's worth it, yeah, I think it's worth it. I think in the end people
will see the truth .... I felt an obligation to tell the truth. There were
things I saw, there were things I learned, there was things I observed that
I felt-that need to be told. The focus continues to be on what I would
call systematic and aggressive tactics to undermine my credibility and
my-some of my personal life.
Id. More recently, Wigand commented, "My reputation has been dragged
through the mud.... In the process, my family life has fallen apart .... [But] I
can honestly state that I have no regrets about my decision to go public. Indeed, I
want to emphasize that I have found an unexpected happiness and joy in
adversity." Weinstein, supra note 8, at 16.
B&W was forced to agree to drop its suit against Wigand as a condition of
the June 20, 1997 settlement. See Accord Spells Relief for Whistle-Blower, NEW
ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, June 21, 1997, at Al. After B&W agreed, Florida
Attorney General Bob Butterworth referred to Wigand as "a true American hero."
Id. Wigand commented, "That's a tremendous relief for me.... I can start
putting my life back together." Id.
Mississippi Attorney General Mike Moore stated, "Jeffrey's testimony is
[Vol. 25
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not being objective; the accusation is perhaps rightly made,
because CBS has agreed to indemnify Wigand and has paid his
172attorneys' fees. Instead of being black and white, the picture
contains many gray areas. The states involved in tobacco litigation
have been jumping on the politically correct bandwagon to
condemn the tobacco industry. After forty years, the tide seems to
have turned against the tobacco industry even though everyone has
known for years that smoking is bad for one's health; "[i]n 1604,
King James I of England characterized smoking as socially
'loathesome' and 'daungerous to the lunges [sic].' 373- Now almost
two-thirds of Americans share a negative view of the tobacco
industry. 74 In contrast, some would claim that the government has
gone too far in attempting to regulate tobacco; if tobacco is
regulated, alcohol or high fat-content foods might be next.375 The
going to be devastating, Mike, to the tobacco industry, so devastating that I fear
for his life.... I'm very serious. The information that Jeffrey has, I think, is the
most important information that has ever come out against the tobacco industry."
60 Minutes, supra. At the news conference announcing the June 20, 1997
settlement, Moore stated:
We just had a heck of a fight about what we think is a true American
hero, Jeffrey Wigand. One piece of this industry wanted to continue to
punish Jeffrey Wigand and we were willing to walk away from this deal
completely-completely-if they didn't concede. They conceded. And
Jeffrey Wigand will be free from the attacks of Brown & Williamson's
tobacco companies in the future and we're very proud of that.
Id.
372. See 60 Minutes, supra note 3. During a deposition June 16, 1997, Wigand
was represented by CBS-paid attorneys, John Aldock and Laura Wertheimer. See
Joe Ward, B&W Attorneys Resume Questioning of Wigand, COURIER-J. (Louisville),
June 17, 1997, at 4A.
373. Ilene Barth, Smoking Mad over Tobacco's Demise: Forget About Walking a Mile
for a Camel. Many Smokers are Having to Crawl for Their Civil Rights, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, Nov. 2, 1997, at GI.
374. See Top Goblin, WALL ST. J., Oct. 31, 1997, at Al. The U.S. Postal Service
has hopped on the politically correct bandwagon. A Postal Service brochure
features a 1924 photograph of rugged mail pilot William "Big Bill" Hopson, minus
his cigarette which had been airbrushed out of his hand. SeeJulie DeFalco, Mail
Fraud, WALL ST.J., Dec. 4, 1997, at A22.
375. See John Kennedy, Tobacco Troubles Starting to Spread; Other Businesses Fear
Copycat Lawsuits Seeking Huge Amounts of Money Will be Filed Against Them, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, Aug. 3, 1997, at Al. A Washington "milk-a-holic" filed a lawsuit against
dairy farmers, claiming they should be held liable because his milk consumption
caused his stroke. See id. A recent article on the editorial page of The Wall Street
Journal was accompanied by a cartoon showing the McDonald's clown with a
noose around its neck and hands tied behind its back sitting astride a race horse.
See Mark F. Bernstein, A Big Fat Target, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 1997, at A14. Actor
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addictiveness of tobacco is something obvious that the government
does not need to tell the smoker.376
The current campaign against the tobacco industry moves in
great contrast to an earlier emphasis in this country on
individualism and the strength of the free market system. Florida is
one of the states suing the tobacco industry, yet Florida's argument
that it should be reimbursed Medicaid costs seems a little
hypocritical. The state already pockets high cigarette taxes, which
totaled $423 million in the past fiscal year. That amount is
estimated to exceed the Medicaid funds spent to treat smoking-
377related health problems. The new campaign might be seen as
organized blackmail. The state wants even more money in
exchange for limiting the liability of the tobacco industry. In
addition, the tenor of the new campaign retreats from the
country's tradition of individualism, absolves smokers of liability,
and allows them to deny any personal responsibility for their
actions. One recent study concludes that health care costs are
lower where people smoke; although the cost to treat smokers is
higher than the cost of treating non-smokers, smokers tend to die
earlier, thereby avoiding the higher costs of treating more elderly
individuals.3 78
Clint Eastwood is no fan of political correctness. See John Meroney, Hollywood's
Quiet Conservative, WALL ST. J., Nov. 24, 1997, at A22. Eastwood commented,
"Cigarettes kill people but so does booze and fat food .... The president, who
likes his hamburgers, is sitting there with his cholesterol. Nobody bans that kind
of food-why not?" Id. The first lady chastised Julia Roberts for smoking in "My
Best Friend's Wedding." See id. About that criticism, Eastwood commented,
"Tobacco's just a whipping boy for politicians. The president and first lady bum-
rapping a movie-what the hell? It's just a flick." Id.
376. See Charley Reese, Tobacco Lawsuits Nothing More Than Feeding Frenzy for
Lawyers, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Apr. 13, 1997, at G2.
377. See Scott Gold & Noreen Marcus, Florida's Law Like 'Nuclear Weapon'
Against Tobacco Industry; But If the Law is Deemed Unconstitutional, Its Case to Recoup
Health-Care Costs Could Crumble, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 4, 1997, at A7.
378. SeeJan J. Barendregt et al., The Health Care Costs of Smoking, 337 NEw ENG.
J. MED. 1052, 1052 (1997). The authors noted:
Health care costs for smokers at a given age are as much as 40 percent
higher than those for nonsmokers, but in a population in which no one
smoked the costs would be 7 percent higher among men and 4 percent
higher among women than the costs in the current mixed population of
smokers and nonsmokers. If all smokers quit, health care costs would be
lower at first, but after 15 years they would become higher than at
present. In the long term, complete smoking cessation would produce a
net increase in health care costs, but it could still be seen as
economically favorable under reasonable assumptions of discount rate
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The "wrongness" of the tobacco industry's actions was not that
clear until recently. When Mississippi's Attorney General Mike
Moore filed the first state reimbursement suit against the tobacco
industry, he seemed to have little chance of winning. 79 From the
outset, Wigand's actions seemed clearly wrong. He allegedly
breached several confidentiality agreements he had signed with
B&W. An attorney for B&W stated, "Wigand had four
confidentiality agreements, violated them, and then went on
television and hed. Wigand profited handsomely from one of
his first disclosures about the tobacco industry, earning $12,000 to
analyze some Philip Morris documents for 60 Minutes.
The intense involvement of B&W attorneys in scientific
matters can be looked at from two different perspectives. On one
hand, the attorneys could be seen as conscientious, offering advice
on legal issues; under that theory, the attorneys were working with
no more information than what was generally available in the
scientific community at the time. On the other hand, the attorneys
could be seen as pretending to give normal legal advice, but in
reality be an essential part of a tobacco industry conspiracy to keep
crucial information concerning health risks hidden from the
public."" Dicta in a recent case involving B&W highlights one of
the two perspectives:
If the B&W strategy were accepted, those seeking to bury
their unlawful or potentially unlawful acts from
consumers, from other members of the public, and from
law enforcement or regulatory authorities could achieve
that objective by a simple yet ingenious strategy: all that
would need to be done would be to delay or confuse any
charges of health hazard, fraud, corruption, overcharge,
nuclear or chemical contamination, bribery, or other
misdeeds, by focusing instead on inconvenient
documentary evidence and labeling it as the product of
and evaluation period.
Id.
379. See Helm, supra note 9, at IA ("Tobacco lawyers, fighting now on many
fronts, initially dismissed Moore's suit as a gimmick and a contorted abuse of tort
law.").
380. Id.
381. See 60 Minutes, supra note 3.
382. See Milo Geyelin, Lawyers Shielded Tobacco Firms, Papers Show, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 7, 1997, at A3.
1999]
59
Bast: At What Price Silence: Are Confidentiality Agreements Enforceable
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1999
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
theft, violation of proprietary information, interference
with contracts, and the like. The result would be that
even the most severe public health and safety dangers
would be subordinated in litigation and in the public
mind to the malefactor's tort or contract claims, real or
fictitious.
Wigand's annual salary at B&W was in excess of $300,000 and
he headed a department of 243 people, with a budget of over thirty
million dollars.8 4 Wigand claims he was hired by B&W to work on
a safe cigarette project but the project was eliminated after Wigand• • 385
joined B&W. Wigand states that he began to ask questions
383. Maddox v. Williams, 855 F. Supp. 406, 415 (D.D.C. 1994). Although the
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, the appellate court
chastised the lower court for its seemingly partisan comments. See Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams, 62 F.3d 408, 411-12 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
Maddox arose out of a state court case in which B&W's law firm sued the firm's
former paralegal for removing copies of B&W documents while the paralegal was
engaged in document production for the firm. See id. The copies became
available to the media and to Congress. See id. A University of California at San
Francisco professor of medicine, Stanton A. Glantz, wrote:
Tobacco is the leading preventable cause of death: cigarettes and other
tobacco products kill 420,000 American smokers and 53,000 non-
smokers every year. This toll exceeds the deaths resulting from alcohol
abuse, AIDS, traffic accidents, homicides, and suicides combined.
Nevertheless, the tobacco industry continues to promote and sell its
products, unhampered by any meaningful government regulation except
for mostly local restrictions designed to protect nonsmokers from the
toxins in secondhand tobacco smoke. In fact, the tobacco industry is
unique among American and worldwide industries in its ability to
forestall effective government regulation and to hold effective public
health action at bay while marketing its lethal products.
STANTON A. GLANTz ET AL., THE CIGARETrE PAPERS xvii (1996).
384. See Brenner, supra note 2, at 176.
385. See id. at 178. Wigand told 60 Minutes:
They were looking to reduce the hazards within cigarettes, reduce the
carcinogenic components-or-or list the carcinogens that were within
the tobacco products.... People will continue to smoke no matter what,
no matter what kind of regulations. If you can provide for those who are
smoking and who need to smoke something that produces less risk for
them-I thought I was going to be making a difference ....
60 Minutes, supra note 3.
Wigand became frustrated by the lawyers' intervention and presence at
major scientific meetings. See id. Wigand said in response to his questions, he was
told by then president and later B&W chief executive officer Thomas Sandefur,
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concerning B&W research and the questions negatively impacted
his future with B&W.38  He admits that he "became increasingly
vocal," "sounding off at meetings."38 7 His evaluations after 1991
reflected that he had "a difficulty in communication."3 8  B&W
claims he was fired "for telling half-truths and for an abusive style
with coworkers.
"
,3
9
When B&W fired Wigand, Wigand received severance pay and
390continued health benefits. After leaving B&W, Wigand
complained to a friend at B&W about his severance benefits;
Wigand claims that, in response, B&W sued him for breach of
contract. 39 To keep his medical benefits, Wigand "reluctantly
signed an onerous, lifelong confidentiality agreement [in
November 1993] so stringent that he could be in violation if he
discussed anything about the corporation." 392  The agreement
barred Wigand from disclosing "any and all information, whether
privileged, confidential, trade secrets or any other information
acquired by you." 93 According to the company, "Wigand cannot
possibly testify as a 'tobacco' expert.., without violating the terms
of his various agreements with B&W."
3 9 4
After Wigand left B&W, CBS' 60 Minutes used Wigand as a
confidential expert and later persuaded Wigand to be the subject
of a 60 Minutes interview. 95 Mike Wallace interviewed Wigand in
August 1995 after Wigand received CBS's written promise to
396indemnify him if B&W sued him for libelY. The interview was
scheduled to be broadcast in November; however, CBS cancelled
the interview for fear of liability and did not name Wigand as the
interviewee. 97 Wigand was named for the first time as the 60
"'I don't want to hear any more discussion about a safer cigarette.... We pursue a
safer cigarette, it would put us at extreme exposure with every other product. I
don't want to hear about it anymore.'" Id.
386. See Brenner, supra note 2, at 177.
387. Id.
388. Id. at 178.
389. Helm, supra note 9, at IA.
390. See 60 Minutes, supra note 3.
391. See id.
392. Brenner, supra note 2, at 180.
393. Id.
394. Id.
395. See 60 Minutes, supra note 3.
396. See Howard Kurtz "60 Minutes" Team Sticks Out Rough Spots; Despite
Dropping Ratings - and Sour Moods, CBS's Original Newsmagazine is Riding Out the
Storm, AUSTiN AM.-STATESMAN, Dec. 24, 1995, at 5.
397. See Brenner, supra note 2, at 208. On September 12, 1995, CBS general
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Minutes interviewee on November 17, 1995 when a newspaper
article identified Wigand as the former tobacco executive
whistleblower.39 s  CBS agreed to indemnify Wigand after his
identity was leaked to the press.399
On November 21, 1995, B&W sued Wigand in Jefferson
County, Kentucky Circuit Court claiming he had breached an
employment agreement, a confidentiality agreement, a letter of
agreement, and a settlement agreement ("the Agreements"). 40°
B&W claimed that the Agreements barred Wigand from disclosing
information or documents Wigand obtained while employed by
B&W or in connection with his B&W employment.4" More
specifically, B&W claimed that the following actions violated the
Agreements:
(1) Wigand has offered his services as an expert witness in
two separate civil suits; (2) Wigand has given The Wall
Street Journal and the Washington Post confidential B&W
documents; (3) Wigand has disclosed confidential
information and trade secrets in an interview with 60
Minutes, and (4) Wigand has cooperated with the
counsel counseled 60 Minutes executives against airing the Wigand interview for
fear of B&W suing CBS for tortious interference with Wigand's confidentiality
agreement. See id. A November 9, 1995 New York Times article stated that the 60
Minutes interview with the former tobacco executive would not be shown for fear
of CBS being sued for tortious interference with contractual relations. See Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Wigand, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 1, 1996, at 26. During the 60
Minutes November 12, 1995 broadcast, Mike Wallace announced that it could not
broadcast its interview with an unnamed former executive for fear of potential
liability. See 60 Minutes-Profile: Cigarettes; CBS Says No To Interview Regarding
Tobacco Industry Due To Possible Lawsuit (CBS television broadcast, Nov. 12, 1995),
available in 1995 WL 2729850.
398. See Howard Kurtz, Details of Unaired Tobacco Story Emerge; Cigarette Firm Ex-
Official Told CBS of Cancer-Causing Flavoring, WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 1995, at A3. On
November 17, 1995, the New York Daily News printed a story identifying Wigand.
See id. Information for the story came from a transcript of the cancelled 60
Minutes interview with Wigand. See id. On January 26, 1996, The Wall Street Journal
published information from a deposition Wigand had given in the Mississippi
lawsuit and that evening the CBS Evening News aired portions of a 60 Minutes
interview with Wigand. See Fla. Adds to Tobacco Makers' Woes, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 12,
1996, at A8.
399. See 60 Minutes, supra note 3.
400. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Wigand, 913 F. Supp. 530, 531
(W.D. Ky. 1996). The complaint contained counts for "theft, fraud, breach of
contract, breach of fiduciary and common law duties, and violation of the
Kentucky Uniform Trade Secrets Act." Id.
401. See id.
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Mississippi Attorney General in a Mississippi civil case.42
Wigand's August 1995 interview and a subsequent interview
were finally shown on 60 Minutes on February 4, 1996.
What did Wigand disclose? He disclosed that tobacco
executives had admitted privately that nicotine is addictive,43 that
tobacco causes cancer and other health problems, that the tobacco• • • 404
company manipulates nicotine levels, that additives to the
402. Id. On February 5, 1996, Wigand filed a counterclaim against B&W. See
Joe Ward, Wigand Sues B&W Over Privacy Issue, COURIER-J. (Louisville), Feb. 6,
1996, at IA. The counterclaim charges that B&W invaded Wigand's privacy and
asks for actual and punitive damages from B&W. See id. The counterclaim alleges
that the Agreements are unenforceable because they "prohibit the disclosure of
information necessary to protect the public health." Id. In February 1996, a
federal grand jury reportedly began investigating whether B&W is attempting to
deter Wigand from testifying against B&W. See U.S. Probing B&W Effort to Discredit
Wigand, COURIER-J. (Louisville), Feb. 7, 1996, at 8B. Wigand is on the witness list
in the Washington grand jury investigation into whether tobacco executives
committed perjury in their testimony before a congressional subcommittee. See
Alix M. Freedman & Suein L. Hwang, Brown & Williamson Faces Inquiry/Grand Jury
Examines Possible Intimidation of Witness Wigand, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 1996, at A3.
On April 4, 1996 Wigand moved to rule the Agreements unenforceable as
"contrary to public policy." SeeJoe Ward, Wigand Seeks Ruling That Invalidates His
Confidentiality Pacts, COURIER-J. (Louisville), Apr. 5, 1996, at 1OB.
403. See 60 Minutes, supra note 3. Wigand reported that B&W's public stance
on whether nicotine is addictive was in sharp contrast to private statements by
B&W executives. See id. B&W has publicly defended itself by arguing that
nicotine is not addictive and smoking is a matter of free choice. See id. Gordon
Smith, a B&W attorney, stated:
[I]t's absurd to suggest that tobacco is any way like cocaine in terms of
addiction. It's absolutely absurd to suggest that. Brown ' & Williamson
makes a lawful product. They sell it and make it in a lawful way....
[F]ifty million people choose to use tobacco and smoke.... People
choose to smoke. People choose to stop smoking.... It's their choice.
It's a lawful product. It's marketed and manufactured lawfully.
Id.
During an April 1994 congressional hearing, the chief executives of the
seven largest United States tobacco companies testified. See Brenner, supra note
2, at 206. Sandefur then testified, "I believe that nicotine is not addictive." Id.
Wigand stated, "I believe he [Sandefur] perjured himself." 60 Minutes, supra note
3. B&W executives privately acknowledged the addictive effect of nicotine. See id.
"There have been numerous statements made by a number of officers,
particularly Mr. Sandefur, that we're in the nicotine-delivery business." Alix M.
Freedman, The Deposition: Cigarette Defector Says CEO Lied to Congress About View of
Nicotine; Wigand claims B&W Chief "Frequently" Mentioned Its Addictive Properties; Firm
Calls Charges "Fantasy "WALL ST.J.,Jan. 26, 1996, at Al.
404. See Alix M. Freedman, "Impact Booster": Tobacco Firm Shows How Ammonia
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company's products present health dangers,40 5 and that the
406
company used strategies to keep that information private.
Spurs Delivery of Nicotine/Brown & Williamson Papers Claim Wide Industry Use of
Additive in Cigarettes, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 1995, at Al. Wigand has testified that
B&W used ammonia additives as the "primary method of managing or
manipulating nicotine delivery" by converting nicotine into "free nicotine" and
used acetaldehyde as an "impact booster," both additives enhancing the nicotine
effect on smokers. See id. A 1991 B&W handbook for leaf blenders and product
developers:
[E]xplains how ammonia scavenges nicotine from tobacco and converts
it into a form with greater impact on smokers. Nicotine in this
'pharmacologically active' or 'free' form has a more powerful effect than
nonammoniated nicotine because it gets absorbed more quickly into a
smoker's bloodstream .... [T]hus, by harnessing ammonia-producing
additives, a manufacturer can enhance nicotine delivery without actually
adding nicotine.
Id. Wigand explained, "There's extensive use of this technology, which is called
ammonia chemistry, that allows for nicotine to be more rapidly absorbed in the
lungs and, therefore, affect the brain and central nervous system." 60 Minutes,
supra note 3.
405. See 60 Minutes, supra note 3. Glycerol, added to cigarettes to keep the
cigarettes moist, turns into acrolein when burned. See id. Research has shown
that acrolein "has been shown to interfere with the normal clearing of the lungs"
and "acts like a carcinogen." Id. Wigand also questioned the use of coumarin in
Sir Walter Raleigh pipe tobacco. See id. Coumarin was added to tobacco to give it
a "vanilla-like" flavor. See id. Scientists discovered that it caused liver damage
when tested on rats and dogs, and they suspected it was carcinogenic. See GLANTZ
ETAL., supra note 383, at 221. In a deposition, Wigand stated, "I was concerned of
the continued use of coumarin in pipe tobacco after the coumarin had been
removed from cigarettes because of the FDA not allowing the use of coumarin in
foods with additives. The reason why it stayed in pipe tobacco is the removal
would change the taste of the pipe tobacco and, therefore, affect sales." Id. A
1992 National Toxicology Program report described the carcinogenic effect of
coumarin, an additive in Sir Walter Raleigh pipe tobacco. See Brenner, supra note
2, at 178-79. Wigand commented:
And when I came on board at B&W, they had tried to... transition from
coumarin to another similar flavor that would give the same taste. And it
was unsuccessful.... I wanted it out immediately. And I was told that it
would affect sales and I was to mind my own business. And then I
constructed a memo to Mr. Sandefur indicating that I could not, in
conscience, continue with coumarin, a product that we now knowingly
have documentation that is [a] lung-specific carcinogen.... I sent the
document forward to Sandefur. I was told that-that we would continue
working on a substitute, and we weren't going to remove it because it
would impact sales. And that's-that was his decision.
60 Minutes, supra note 3.
406. See Brenner, supra note 2, at 174. Wigand discovered that B&W attorneys
64
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 14
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol25/iss2/14
AT WHAT PRICE SILENCE
D. Wigand and the "Typical" Whistleblower: How Does Wigand Compare
to the "Typical" Whistleblower?
"Internal whistleblowing" involves reporting a wrongdoing to a
superior within the organization while "external whistleblowing"
involves reporting a wrongdoing to a government agency, to a law
enforcement authority, or to the media. A whistleblower may blow
the whistle internally, blow the whistle externally, or blow the
whistle externally after first having blown it internally if the
wrongdoing is not corrected. External whistleblowers "do not
differ significantly" from internal whistleblowers. °7
Whistleblowing is usually a loyal rather than a disloyal act.
Research shows that whistleblowers "are long-time employees, fairly
high in the organization, who have a strong sense of organizational
loyalty."408 Most employees refrain from reporting a wrongdoing;
employees are more likely to blow the whistle where the
wrongdoing is serious and the whistleblower has "direct evidence"
of the wrongdoing.4°9  The "primary motivation" of the
whistleblower is to "correct wrongdoing."410  "[I]ncidents of
groundless or spiteful whistleblowing, or whistleblowing motivated
only by personal gain, are rare.
4
1
limited the amount of sensitive scientific information available. See id. This
included "document management-having the information "shipped offshore,"
removing "deadwood"-B&W attorney's counsel not to "make any notes, memos,
or lists," and attorney editing of documents. See id. Much of the company's
research, including nicotine research was done overseas. See id. Wigand's
observations were supported by a January 1990 B&W internal memo which
included the following suggestions for document management:
Educating scientists in each research centre about document
writing/document creation. Regular lawyer review and audits of
scientific documents produced in each company. Arranging a system to
ensure that all research-related conference minutes involving
representatives of more than one group are vetted by the lawyer before
the minutes are sent out.
Memo Details Effort to Restrict Tobacco Info, ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 18, 1996, at A3.
This "document management" designed to limit available information
contrasts with the tobacco industry's claim that it commits itself to internal and
external research to determine tobacco's health effects. See GLANTZ ET AL., supra
note 383, at 2.
407. Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 241, at 304.
408. Id. at 300-01 (footnote omitted).
409. See id. at 303.
410. See Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 245, at 166.
411. Id.
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Internal whistleblowing is usually preferred by the employee
and by the organization. Internal whistleblowing gives the
organization the opportunity to correct the wrongdoing, and a
positive response from the organization may elevate the status of
the whistleblower within the organization.: Research shows that
most external whistleblowing follows internal whistleblowing 2
External whistleblowing to the media is "seldom" accomplished by
private employees. 1 3
External whistleblowing to the government is protected under
many state whistleblowing statutes while external whistleblowing to
414the media is not. External whistleblowing to the government is a
possible second step if internal whistleblowing fails to receive a
positive response. However, a sophisticated whistleblower who
does not believe external whistleblowing to the government will
correct the wrongdoing is likely to do so to the media. An
internal whistleblower to whom the organization has not been
responsive is likely to blow the whistle to the media if: (1) the
organization is dependent on the wrongdoing; (2) the
organization is not receptive to dissent; and (3) the wrongdoer is• • 416
influential within the organization. Whistleblowing is less likely
where only one of the first two factors are present.
Whistleblowing to the media likely involves wrongdoing which
occurs more often and concerns more money than whistleblowing
to another recipient; whistleblowing to the media is also "much
more likely" where the wrongdoing involves "health or safety.
418
The fear of retaliation may deter whistleblowing; but if the
organization retaliates against the whistleblower for internal
whistleblowing, the whistleblower will likely blow the whistle
externally.4" A minority of whistleblowers are retaliated against by
their organizations, but the organization is more likely to retaliate
if the whistleblowing is external and retaliation is more likely where
420management discourages internal reporting of a wrongdoing.
Management correction of a wrongdoing reported by a
412. See Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 241, at 304.
413. See Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 85, at 395.
414. See Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 241, at 301.
415. See Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 245, at 167.
416. See id. at 165-66.
417. See Rutzel, supra note 43, at 39-40.
418. See Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 245, at 178-79.
419. See id.
420. See Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 85, at 301-02.
[Vol. 25
66
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 14
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol25/iss2/14
AT WHAT PRICE SILENCE
whistleblower is not likely to be reported in the media; most media
reports involve a whistleblower who has been retaliated against or
management failure to correct a wrongdoing identified by a
whistleblower.
42
Research shows that the organization may respond to
allegations of organizational wrongdoing in two different ways.
The organization may either try to enhance the organization's
image or the organization may try to discredit its accuser. In the
"enhancement of self' strategy, organizations emphasize that:
(a) they must remain independent of special interest
groups; (b) their current policy is "fair and just"; or (c)
that they attempted to communicate with the accusers. In
the "derogation strategy," the organization's
spokespersons claim (a) the accuser's allegations are
untrue; (b) the accusers don't understand the business;
(c) their organization has been unfairly singled out; or
(d) the accuser's motivations were devious.H
Wigand closely matches the profile of the typical
whistleblower. He is the highest ranking official from the tobacco
industry to blow the whistle;423 he is a scientist who had specific
responsibility for research, the area associated with the disclosure,
possessed relevant information, and had the expertise to evaluate• • 424
the information. He first blew the whistle internally by voicing
his concerns to B&W's president and speaking up in meetings.
Wigand encountered the three factors making him more likely to
426blow the whistle to the media. Wigand reported practices vital to
the survival of the tobacco industry; B&W is very dependent on the
arguments that tobacco is not addictive, and it is funding research
to evaluate tobacco's safety and health risks.42 B&W has shown in
its vigorous and costly defense of anti-tobacco litigation that it is
421. See id. at 394.
422. MARCIA P. MICELI & JANET P. NEAR, BLOWING THE WHISTLE: THE
ORGANIZATIONAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPANIES AND EMPLOYEES 87
(1992).
423. See supra notes 384-406.
424. See id.
425. See id.
426. See id.
427. See id.
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hostile to dissent. 42 Top management is directly involved in the
"wrongdoing," having constructed B&W's line of defense.429
Additionally, the potential exposure of B&W involves great sums of
money, and the "wrongdoing" is continuous and concerns the
430public's health and safety. Wigand's major claims were that the
additive, coumarin, a known carcinogen, was added to pipe
tobacco for taste,431 ammonia was added to cigarettes to boost the
432delivery of nicotine, and that B&W's chief executive officer
perjured himself before Congress in stating that tobacco was not
addictive.4 3 The alleged wrongdoing involves heath and safety. 434
Annually, over 400,000 deaths are attributed to smoking. 435 B&W
has adopted the derogation strategy of discrediting Wigand in
dealing with Wigand's accusations.
IV. PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION TO CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENTS
A. Unconscionability and Public Policy
Basic contract principles dictate that a contract or a contract
term may be unenforceable because of unconscionability or
because a term is contrary to public policy.437  However,
428. See id. For example, in another B&W case, the judge noted:
One may well doubt, to put it charitably, that B&W would be mounting a
tremendous and costly effort, in Kentucky and in the District of
Columbia, in proceedings against members of a congressional
committee and against the mass of the media, if the documents at issue
did not present the proverbial "smoking gun" evidencing the company's
allegedly long-held and long-suppressed knowledge that its product
constitutes a serious health hazard.
Maddox v. Williams, 855 F. Supp. 406, 415 n. 31 (D.D.C. 1994).
The costly tobacco industry defense has been estimated to cost $600
million annually. See Suein L. Hwang & Milo Geyelin, Tobacco Pact Will Enrich Two
Law Firms, WALL ST.J., Dec. 3, 1997, atA2.
429. See supra notes 384-406.
430. See id.
431. See id.
432. See id.
433. See id.
434. See id.
435. See id.
436. See id.
437. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981). This section,
entitled "Unconscionable Contract or Term," provides:
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"unconscionability" lacks a precise definition to aid a court
reviewing a challenged contract.4 s
One may capture the essence of unconscionability by reading
the definitions of unconscionability fashioned by the courts. An
early definition of an unconscionable contract was a "bargain...
such as no man in his senses and not under a delusion would make
on one hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on the
other."43 9 Another early definition of an unconscionable contract
If a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is
made a court may refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the
remainder of the contract without the unconscionable term, or may so
limit the application of any unconscionable term as to avoid any
unconscionable result.
Id.
438. SeeJames A. Harley, Economic Duress and Unconscionability: How Fair Must
the Government Be?, 18 PUB. CONT. L.J. 76, 131 (1988). Harley comments,
"Unconscionability is a legal theory in search of a meaning." Id. Another scholar
notes that the doctrine of unconscionability has never been well-defined. SeeJane
P. Mallor, Unconscionability in Contracts Between Merchants, 40 Sw. L.J. 1065, 1070-71
(1986). Another scholar notes that "[s]ince its introduction into Western
common law, the doctrine of unconscionability has lacked a clear and precise
definition." Asifa Quraishi, Comment, From a Gasp to a Gamble: A Proposed Test for
Unconscionability, 25 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 187, 189 (1991).
Many unconscionability cases arise in connection with the sale of goods
and are decided under the Uniform Commercial Code. Section 2-302 of the
Uniform Commercial Code allows a court much leeway in holding a contract
unconscionable. It provides:
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court
may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of
the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the
application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable
result.
U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (1990).
"[S]ection 2-302 affords judges great power to police agreements but
offers little coherent guidance on how to accomplish the task .... " Robert A.
Hillman, Debunking Some Myths About Unconscionability: A New Framework for U. C.C
Section 2-302, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 1-2 (1981). Section 2-302 is "amorphous[ly]
uninteligib[le]." Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's
New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 488 (1967). One scholar concludes that the
definition of unconscionability found in section 2-302 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, which some have criticized for its "abstraction" and
.meaninglessness," is appropriately vague. See M.P. Ellinghaus, In Defense of
Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757, 758, 814-15 (1969).
439. Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 411 (1889) (quoting Earl of
Chesterfield v.Janssen, 28 Eng. Rep. 82, 100 (1750)).
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was one containing "an inequality so strong, gross and manifest,
that it must be impossible to state it to a man of common sense
without producing an exclamation at the inequality of it."" 0 In a
famous 1948 case, Campbell Soup Company sued a carrot farmer
and asked a court to specifically enforce its contract with the
farmer.441 Because of short supply, the contract carrots had risen
astronomically in price from the contract price of $30 per ton to
$90 per ton, and the farmer did not want to sell Campbell the
carrots at the low contract price. The court noted the many one-
sided provisions contained in the form contract, all of which ran in
favor of Campbell.4 3 One of the provisions allowed Campbell to
reject the carrots and then prohibited the grower from selling the
carrots to a third party without Campbell's permission.4 The court
refused to grant specific performance and stated, "We think it is
too hard a bargain and too one-sided an agreement to entitle thetoar,4bran n . 5fc 446
plaintiff to relief in a court of conscience. In a 1965 case, a
court stated, "Unconscionability has generally been recognized to
include an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the
parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably
favorable to the other party."44 7  In a 1994 dissent,48 a judge
argued, "If the contract.., is not substantively unconscionable, it is
hard to imagine one that is. The agreement is 'shocking to the
conscience,' 'monstrously harsh,' 'exceedingly calloused,' or
whatever other term that has ever been used in case law to describe
an unconscionable contract."449
"Public policy" is similarly imprecise. An English case from
the first quarter of the nineteenth century aptly describes the
indeterminate nature of public policy. The English court stated,
"[P]ublic policy is 'a very unruly horse, and when once you get
astride it you never know where it will carry you. It may lead you
440. Stiefler v. McCullough, 174 N.E. 823, 826 (Ind. Ct. App. 1931) (quoting
Gwynne v. Heaton, 28 Eng. Rep. 949,953 (1778)).
441. See Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80, 81 (3d Cir. 1948).
442. See id. at 82.
443. See id. at 83.
444. See id.
445. Id.
446. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C.
Cir. 1965).
447. Id.
448. See Nelson v. McGoldrick, 871 P.2d 177, 184 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994)
(Alexander, J. dissenting).
449. Id.
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from the sound law. It is never argued at all but when other points
fail." 450 Section 178 (1) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts states,
"A promise or other term of an agreement is unenforceable on
grounds of public policy if legislation provides that it is
unenforceable or the interest in its enforcement is clearly
outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy against the
enforcement of such terms."45' The United States Supreme Court
has also recognized that a court must balance the challenged
contractual provision against the public policy detrimentally
affected if the provision were enforced.4 ' The Court stated, "[A]
promise is unenforceable if the interest in its enforcement is
outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy harmed by the
enforcement of the agreement.
" 41
3
The following discussion of public policy is from Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc. In Henningsen, Mrs. Henningsen was
driving an almost brand new Chrysler car when the car ran off the
road and crashed into a sign and a brick wall because of a steering
malfunction. 455 The Henningsens had taken possession of the car
456
ten days earlier, and the odometer read 468 miles. The written
Chrysler warranty tracked the language of the Automobile
Manufacturers Association, at a time when most car manufacturers
were members of the association. 45 '7  The warranty obligated
Chrysler to replace defective parts for the earlier of the first ninety
days or 4,000 miles after the Henningsens shipped the car to the
Chrysler factory at the Henningsens' expense; the determination of
a defective part was at Chrysler's discretion.45' The Chrysler
warranty disclaimed any other warranty, including an implied
warranty of merchantability. 459 The court stated:
450. Richardson v. Mellish, 130 Eng. Rep. 294, 303 (1824).
451. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(1) (1981).
452. See Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).
453. Id.
454. 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
455. See id. at 75.
456. See id.
457. See id. at 78, 87. The court noted, "General Motors, Inc., Ford, Chrysler,
Studebaker-Packard, American Motors, (Rambler), Willys Motors, Checker
Motors Corp., and International Harvester" were members of the association, and
for 1958 the first three manufacturers accounted for 93.5% of car production. See
id. at 87.
458. See id. at 74.
459. See id. at 84.
1999]
71
Bast: At What Price Silence: Are Confidentiality Agreements Enforceable
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1999
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
Public policy is a term not easily defined. Its significance
varies as the habits and needs of a people may vary. It is
not static and the field of application is an ever increasing
one. A contract,.or a particular provision therein, valid in
one era may be wholly opposed to the public policy of
another.... Courts keep in mind that principle that the
best interests of society demand that persons should not
be unnecessarily restricted in their freedom to contract.
But they do not hesitate to declare void as against public
policy contractual provisions which clearly tend to the
injury of the public in some way.... [W]e are of the
opinion that Chrysler's attempted disclaimer of an
implied warranty of merchantability and of the
obligations arising therefrom is so inimical to the public
good as to compel an adjudication of its invalidity.
Unconscionability and public policy are related theories courts
may use to hold contracts unenforceable. 461 In fact, the two
theories may overlap at times.4 2 Unconscionability may concern
either society's interest or the interest of one of the parties, while
public policy concerns society's interest.46 3 Henningsen and Campbell
Soup illustrate the overlap between unconscionability and public
policy.4e  While the Henningsen court spoke in terms of public
policy,46 5 the warranty disclaimer could just as well have been
invalidated as unconscionable. The disclaimer was unconscionable
as to the Henningsens46 under any one or all of the above case law
definitions of unconscionability because the bargain it drove was
too hard. Likewise, the court easily held the disclaimer contrary to
public policy because it was part of a standardized form contract of
adhesion offered by Chrysler on a take it or leave it basis and
460. Id. at 94-95.
461. See supra notes 437-60.
462. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. a. (1981). The
Restatement specifically notes: "[T] he policy [against unconscionable contracts or
terms] ... overlaps with rules which render particular bargains or terms
unenforceable on grounds of public policy." Id. Frank P. Darr, in
Unconscionability and Price Fairness, 30 Hous. L. REv. 1819 (1994), suggested that
"the purpose of unconscionability is to allow the courts to enforce the
community's sense of commercial morality." Id. at 1849.
463. See supra notes 437-60.
464. See supra notes 441-60.
465. See Henningsen, 161 A.2d at 94-95.
466. See id.
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presumably used by the rest of the major car manufacturers. 467
Thus, the disclaimer impacted on the parties to the Henningsen
transaction, but also on an interest of society. The Campbell Soup
court invalidated the carrot contract because of
unconscionability,4 but could have stated just as well that it was
refusing to enforce the contract because it was contrary to public
policy. The Campbell Soup contract was a standardized form
contract offered to farmers on a take it or leave it basis.469
B. A Proposed Test for Determining the Enforceability of Confidentiality
Agreements
What would the hypothetical perfect confidentiality agreement
look like? It would protect the employer against disclosure of trade
secrets and similar information but would allow the employee to
disclose information concerning general knowledge and skills.
The reasonable expectation is that the confidentiality agreement
will protect the types of things commonly protected as trade
secrets. A confidentiality agreement should protect the employer's
product and limit disclosure by the employee but not take away the
employee's livelihood. The employer has an interest in protecting
proprietary information, and the employee has an interest in
protecting the employee's source of income.
With the increase in whistleblowing, as well as in employee
confidentiality agreements, the enforceability of confidentiality
agreements may be questioned more frequently. An employee
subject to a confidentiality agreement may claim that enforcement
of the agreement will adversely affect the health or safety of third
parties or conceal illegality; the employee may claim the employer
has bought the employee's silence through a confidentiality
agreement to avoid costly correction of wrongdoing. A gray area is
where concealment of a potentially defective or harmful product
allows a company to continue manufacturing it without eliminating
the defect and profiting from the defective product. Challenges to
confidentiality agreements are difficult cases to decide. Where an
employee claims a design defect presenting a substantial health or
safety risk, the employer may argue there is no substantial risk to
health or safety and the claimed "defect" is inextricably related to
467. See id.
468. See Campbell Soup, 171 F.2d at 83.
469. See id.
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trade secrets or protected confidential information.
Examples of a concealed product defect or illegality which
caused great harm to the public include the Challenger explosion,
the Pinto rear-end collisions, the Love Canal contamination, and
the Three Mile Island nuclear disaster. Design problems on the
Challenger presented an imminent danger to crew members even
though there may have been no statutory violation. Similarly,
plaintiffs in Pinto lawsuits contended that design problems with the
Pinto presented an imminent danger to passengers. The Love
Canal and Three Mile Island incidents threatened health and
safety, while presumably violating civil and, possibly, criminal
statutes.
Early whistleblowing in each of those incidents could have
avoided serious danger and considerable harm to product users,
bystanders, and the general public. The significant public health
and safety risks and statutory violations of those incidents signal
organizational failure. In each incident, it was less costly, at least in
the short run, to stifle whistleblowing. Use of confidentiality
agreements in an analogous situation may conceal a practice
contrary to public policy. If the practice is basic to the industry's
viability or profit, the agreements are likely to be enforced to the
letter by litigation.
Other potential Challengers, Pintos, Love Canals, or Three
Mile Islands might be avoided by a public policy exception to
confidentiality agreements for whistleblowing. Logic begs that
disclosure of the same type of information protected by the
whistleblowing public policy exception to the employment at will
doctrine be allowed, even in the face of a confidentiality
470agreement. The movement emphasizing fairness in contracts, in
the development of the public policy exception to employment at
will, and the promulgation of whistleblowing statutes has left
confidentiality agreements behind. Confidentiality agreements
overlay the important relationship of the individual to the
institution and the relationship of the institution to the social order
470. See W. DAVID SLAWSON, BINDING PROMISES: THE LATE 20TH CENTURY
REFORMATION OF CoNTRAcT LAw 44 (1996). W. David Slawson's research shows
that in the 1960s courts in insurance cases began to use "reasonable expectations"
in interpreting insurance policies. See id. A court using reasonable expectations
would enforce the reasonable expectations of the parties rather than contrary
contract language. See id. Slawson describes a trend in courts enforcing the
reasonable expectations of the consumer even in the face of contrary language in
a contract. See id. at 44-73.
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as a whole. The employer profits to the detriment of society if a
confidentiality agreement is used as a shield to protect employer's
illegal acts or defective products. These relationships are the same
ones involved in the public policy exception to the employment at
will doctrine.
Society encourages concern for others. Employees should be
protected, if as a civic act, they disclose wrongful acts of the
employer; otherwise, the employer may exploit the employee's
duty of loyalty. The benefit of disclosure must be weighed against
the employer's loss of protection for trade secrets and proprietary
information. The employer has superior bargaining power
because of superior knowledge of its products and the fact that the
employee needs the income. The employer can easily use this
superior bargaining power when it drafts confidentiality
agreements; the employer may attempt to fashion or to enforce an
overly broad confidentiality agreement to use as a shield to protect
its illegal acts or defective products.
What should be the contours of a whisfleblowing public policy
exception to confidentiality agreements? An exception must start
with the premise that a confidentiality agreement is enforceable.
Few employers require employees to execute confidentiality
agreements for the purpose of covering up illegality, acts contrary
to statute, or acts otherwise contrary to public policy. Most
potential problems with confidentiality agreements arise in the
course of their execution.
An exception can prevent injury to society and to third parties
or can be used to collect necessary information on criminal or
tortious activities or activities in violation of a statute. An exception
can prevent danger to health and safety, prevent illegal or criminal
conduct, and promote compliance with statutes.
A confidentiality agreement may be unenforceable if the
agreement in substance or as applied adversely affects public policy
by precluding whistleblowing which would have disclosed injury to
third parties or to society. It is contrary to public policy and injures
society to suppress information posing a substantial and imminent
health or safety danger to third parties. Keeping information of
illegality or statutory violation secret injures society. An affirmative
promise not to disclose information on illegal acts leads to non-
compliance with the criminal justice system. An affirmative
promise not to disclose information violating statutes thwarts the
purpose of the statutes. Public policy should be based on
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fundamental public values, whether reflected in legislation or not,
where whistleblowing would prevent unnecessary substantial,
irreversible harm or danger to others. The court should also
explore the employer's reasons for enforcing the confidentiality
agreement. Public policy should allow disclosure if the employer
has no overriding legitimate business justification, recognizing that
the purpose of the confidentiality agreement is to avoid unfair
competition.
The cases in the third and fourth sections of Part I lack any
in-depth analysis and fail to develop any theory that a court might
use to determine whether a non-disclosure provision may be set
aside. However, the cases do have several things in common. They
all concern communication of information; the information
concerns an illegality, a tort, or a violation of positive law and
most are in the employment context.474  Disclosure of the
information was generally allowed where it prevented danger to
health and safety, prevented illegal or criminal conduct, and
promoted compliance with statutes. A number ofjournal articles
implicitly recognize that a non-disclosure provision should be set
aside in certain circumstances but fail to offer any guidance to
determine the circumstances for invalidating a non-disclosure
476
provision. The balance of this section will attempt to develop
such a theory. A starting point is the Restatement (Second) of Agency
and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.
The Restatement (Second) of Agency recognizes that at times the
interest of the employer in safeguarding confidential information
may have to yield to an interest of the employee.477 Section 418
provides, "An agent is privileged to protect interests of his own
which are superior to those of the principal, even though he does
so at the expense of the principal's interest or in disobedience to
his orders. 8 Comment a to this section of the Restatement gives
examples of interests which might outweigh the employee's duty of
confidentiality. The comment provides, "[T]he agent has no
471. See supra notes 94-240 and accompanying text.
472. See id.
473. See id.
474. See id.
475. See id.
476. See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
477. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFAGENCY§ 418 (1958).
478. Id.
479. See id. cmt. a.
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duty to commit a tort or a minor crime at the command of the
principal. A contract requiring him to do so is illegal .... ,, 4o
Similarly, the employee's duty to obey the employer may yield
to an interest of the employee or to the interest of a third party.481
Comment a to subsection (1) notes, "In no event would it be
implied that an agent has a duty to perform acts which, although
otherwise within the scope of his duties, are illegal or unethical.
48 2
Comment d to subsection (2) notes that the employee "is under a
duty not to act contrary to what the principal directs, unless he is
acting in the protection of an interest which he is privileged to
protect."483
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts states that a contract term
may be unenforceable as contrary to public policy.48 4 A court could
declare a contract term unenforceable if, after balancing the
interests of the employer, the employee, and society, public poli71
outweighs the employer's interest in enforcing the term.
Subsections (2) and (3) of section 178 of the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts illustrate the process a court would go through to
determine whether a confidentiality agreement is unenforceable. s6
In reviewing the interest in enforcing the challenged term, the
court would have to consider:
(a) the parties' justified expectations,
(b) any forfeiture that would result if enforcement were
denied, and
(c) any special4Rublic interest in the enforcement of the
particular term.
480. Id.
481. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 385 (1958). It provides, "Unless he is
privileged to protect his own or another's interests, an agent is subject to a duty not to
act in matters entrusted to him on account of the principal contrary to the
directions of the principal .... " Id. § 385(2) (emphasis added).
482. Id. § 385(1) cmt. a.
483. Id. § 385(2) cmt. d.
484. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1981). Section 208 of
the Restatement describes the remedies that a court might adopt after finding a
contract term unconscionable. See id. § 208. A court might enforce all but the
unconscionable contract term, might limit the enforcement of the term to avoid
an unconscionable result, or might declare the entire contract unenforceable. See
id.
485. See id. § 178(2) & (3).
486. See id.
487. Id. § 178(2).
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The court would also review the interest in not enforcing the
challenged term to determine:
(a) the strength of that policy as manifested by
legislation or judicial decisions,
(b) the likelihood that a refusal to enforce the term will
further that policy,
(c) the seriousness of any misconduct involved and the
extent to which it was deliberate, and
(d) the directness of the connection between that
misconduct and the term.48
Section 178 (3) (a), which seems to base public policy
exclusively on "legislation or judicial decisions," is further
explained by section 179. 489 Section 179 of the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts states that public policy may be determined by
reference to "legislation relevant to such policy" or "the need to
protect some aspect of the public welfare."
Under basic contract law, a contract is unenforceable if
contrary to public policy. 49 1  Confidentiality agreements are no
488. Id. One of the most widely used formulations of the public policy
exception to the employment at will doctrine contains four elements:
1. That a clear public policy existed and was manifested in a state or
federal constitution, statute or administrative regulation, or in the
common law (the clarity element).
2. That dismissing employees under the circumstances like those
involved in the plaintiffs dismissal would jeopardize the public policy
(the jeopardy element).
3. The plaintiff's dismissal was motivated by conduct related to the
public policy (the causation element).
4. The employer lacked overriding legitimate business justification for
the dismissal (the overriding justification element).
Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The Future of Wrongful Dismissal Claims: Where Does Employer
Self Interest Lie?, 58 U. CIN. L. REv. 397, 398-99 (1989).
Perritt's four-part test contains some interesting similarities to the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts seven-part test. The concerns in both are
identifying the contours of public policy so that it is neither overinclusive nor
underinclusive, determining what detrimental effect enforcement would have on
public policy, and whether, once public policy have been found, there is a
countervailing and superior reason for enforcement.
489. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 179 (1981).
490. Id.
491. See id. § 178.
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different than other contracts in that they may be held to be
unenforceable as contrary to public policy. The difficulty is in
determining public policy. Just because public policy is difficult to
determine does not mean that the quest must be abandoned.
As discussed in the previous section of this part, "public policy"
is difficult to define; determining public policy is similarly difficult
to determine in the at will employment context.493 Defining the
public policy exception to employment at will is "tricky."494 Any," • • , .,• • * ., ,6 . . . ,,495
definition of the term is inherently "uncertain," imprecise,
"vague," "amorphous;" 496 it may be virtually undefinable. One
commentator stated, "Determining what is to be regarded as public
policy is undoubtedly the Achilles heel of the public policy
exception."497 Another commentator stated, "There is no precise
definition of the term." 498  Generally, courts distinguish between
employee whistleblowing in the public interest, which is protected,
and employee whistleblowing to satisfy some private interest, which
does not fall within the exception. A court stated, "[P]ublic
policy concerns what is right and just and what affects the citizens
of the State collectively.... [A] matter must strike at the heart of a
citizen's social riThts, duties, and responsibilities before the tort
will be allowed." But because the public/private distinction is
elusive, whether a court will find the existence of the public policy
exception is "unpredictable."50 1 The same difficulty inheres in
determining the source of public policy:
The cause of action is allowed where the public policy is
clear, but is denied where it is equally clear that only
private interests are at stake. Where the nature of the
interest at stake is muddled, the courts have given
conflicting answers as to whether the protection of the
tort action is available.5 2
492. See supra notes 460-75.
493. See id.
494. See Pennington, supra note 272, at 1593.
495. Id. at 1594 n.62.
496. Fahleson, supra note 276, at 967.
497. Id.
498. Schwab, supra note 280, at 1957 (citing Palmateer v. International
Harvester, 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (Il1. 1981)).
499. See id.
500. Palmateer, 421 N.E.2d at 878-79.
501. Note, supra note 291, at 1949.
502. Palmateer, 421 N.E.2d at 879.
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Because public policy is so hard to determine, the state-created
public policy exceptions to employment at will serve as another
starting point. The public policy exception to the employment at
will doctrine balances the interests of society, the employer and the
employee. This exception is especially appropriate to examine
because the cases illustrate the situations within the employment
context in which society's (and the employee's) interest outweighs
the interest of the employer. After all, if a former employee is able
to sue and collect damages for termination in violation of public
policy, an employee who disclosed the same information and is
sued by the employer for violating a confidentiality agreement,
should be able to use public policy as a defense.
A state might determine if a confidentiality agreement is
unenforceable because of public policy first by looking at the
state's public policy exception to employment at will. If the
whistleblowing would have been sufficient to be an exception to
the state's employment at will doctrine, then the same
whistleblowing should be sufficient to hold a confidentiality
agreement unenforceable. Each state should recognize a defense
to a breach of confidentiality agreement claim as broad as that
allowed under the public policy exception to employment at will.
Strict reliance on positive law may be underinclusive where positive
law does not govern a substantial health or safety danger.
Although synonymous with public policy, a court may be reluctant
to allow an exception to prevent danger to health or safety without
a basis in positive law. In disclosure of health or safety threats,
where should the line be drawn?
Health and safety threats should certainly be disclosed where
the danger is substantial and imminent. Because of the
importance of health and safety, perhaps disclosure should be
allowed where the danger is not quite so substantial or so
imminent. In Green v. Ralee Engineering Co., 503 a 1997 California
case, an employee aircraft inspector complained to the employer
that the employer was shipping defective parts for passenger air
504craft and altering inspection records. In reversing the summary
judgment for the employer, the court stated:
503. 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 352 (Ct. App. 1997).
504. See id. at 356.
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In the hierarchy of public policies, safety from physical
harm and death ranks at or near the top. And, in the
hierarchy of public safety concerns, safe air travel ranks at
or near the top, in large measure because of the
vulnerability of air travelers and the almost certain death
that awaits them if there is a crash.5 °5
This same vulnerability was not recognized by a West Virginia
506court. In the West Virginia case, an airline employee reported an
alleged safety violation of a pilot to management. The court held
that state public policy does not support a wrongful discharge
claim for a violation of federal aviation law. Another example of
a potentially serious threat to health and safety was presented in a
1974 Pennsylvania case, Geary v. United States Steel Corp.5 9 In Geary, a
salesman of tubular products to the oil and gas industry, was fired
after he reported to his supervisor and a company vice president
that he believed that a particular type of tubular casing was not
adequately tested and was dangerous.5 10 After Geary notified his
employer, the product was withdrawn from sale.51' The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Geary's
complaint because no clear mandate of public policy was
S • 511
involved .
In a recent article, Stewart Schwab suggests an alternative to
the current practice of a number of courts of analyzing whether the
public policy exception to employment at will should apply by
searching for a violation of positive law.51' He suggests that a court
analyze third-party effects rather than limit the public policy
exception to violation of positive law; thus, a court should refuse to
enforce a contract with "substantial adverse third-party effects."
514
If one were to reanalyze wrongful discharge cases to determine
505. Id. In Green, the court noted that "the public interest in the proper
manufacture and inspection of aircraft components is so important and so
evident in federal statutory and regulatory law that it satisfies the public interest
exception protecting at will employees from retaliatory discharge" Id.
506. See Tritle v. Crown Airways, Inc., 928 F.2d 81, 82 (4th Cir. 1990).
507. See id.
508. See id.
509. 319 A.2d 174 (Pa. 1974).
510. Seeid. at 175.
511. See id.
512. See id. at 175, 180.
513. See Schwab, supra note 280, at 1945, 1952.
514. Id.
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the effect of the employee whistleblowing on third parties, one
would see that the public policy exception is generally applied
where the effect on persons outside the employer-employee
relationship is substantial and adverse.51 ' For example, in Green,
the aircraft inspector did have a cause of action for reporting the
shipment of defective parts for passenger aircraft where the
516practice violated Federal Aviation authority regulations.
However, other courts have not found that the public policy
exception should apply even where silencing the employee is very
likely to have a substantial adverse effect on third parties.5 7 For
example, in Geary, a discharged employee's lawsuit was dismissed1 .. .. • 518
because it had no basis in positive law. Green and Geary were
similar in that whistleblowing disclosed a substantial adverse threat
to the health and safety of third parties.519 The alleged defects in
company products were hidden, making air travelers and oil and
520gas workers vulnerable to death or serious injury. In
determining whether whistleblowing should be protected, courts
might better analyze whether the effect of the whistleblowing on
third parties is substantial and adverse. That analysis should be
substituted for a search for a public policy basis in positive law.
In advocating a public policy exception to confidentiality
agreements, this author is writing on a clean slate, although against
the backdrop of prior decisions concerning whistdeblowing and the
public policy exception to employment at will. The author
suggests balancing the employer's interest in safeguarding
information against the employee's and society's interests in
disclosure by using the following six-part test. 52 1 A court could hold
515. See supra notes 32141 and accompanying text.
516. See supra notes 503-05 and accompanying text.
517. See supra notes 369-70 and accompanying text.
518. See supra notes 509-12.
519. See supra notes 503-12.
520. See id.
521. Although not a formal part of the six part test, an underlying assumption
is that the employee is whistleblowing in good faith after investigating the
whistleblowing claims. The employee must produce proof sufficient to persuade
a reasonable person that the employee's facts are accurate. The proof required
should be sufficient to avoid unfounded claims. The employee must report the
alleged wrongdoing in good faith after having undertaken a reasonable
investigation. "Good faith" should go to the sufficiency of facts to avoid
unfounded claims but should not negate an employee reporting with mixed
motivation. What is important is the potential harm to society avoided by the
disclosure rather than any employee hostility to the employer; the avoidance of
substantial harm to third parties is identical whether the employee is reporting
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a confidentiality agreement unenforceable if public policy
outweighs the employer's interest. The inquiry is whether the
employer's protection of a trade secret or confidential information
should be safeguarded in the face of some public policy concern.
Another factor is whether an employee can disclose necessary
information without adversely affecting the employer's trade
secrets and confidential information. Borrowing from Schwab, the
existence of public policy should be measured by whether non-
522disclosure would have substantial adverse third-party effects. To
determine whether a challenged confidentiality agreement should
be enforced, a court would examine:
1. what information the parties reasonably expected to be
protected under the confidentiality agreement
(reasonable expectations);
2. any loss to the employer that would result if
enforcement were denied (loss to employer);
3. the extent to which the information is protectable as a
trade secret or proprietary information
(protectability);
4. any substantial adverse effect enforcement of the term
would have on third parties (substantial adverse effect
on third parties);
5. the likelihood that a refusal to enforce the term will
contribute to the effect (exacerbation of adverse
effect); and
6. whether limited disclosure would guard against the
effect while still protecting employer's information
(limited disclosure).
wholly out of employer loyalty or with a combination of a desire to right a wrong
and get even with the employer. Unfounded claims may include those protesting
an internal management decision rather than immoral or illegal conduct and
those based on inaccurate facts made without sufficient investigation. The
employee should also attempt to blow the whistle internally before blowing the
whistle externally unless the employee has good reason to believe that internal
whistleblowing would be futile.
522. See Schwab, supra note 280, at 1945.
1999]
83
Bast: At What Price Silence: Are Confidentiality Agreements Enforceable
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1999
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
C. Application of the Test
The first element, reasonable expectations, examines what
information is protected. The employer and employee could have
reasonably thought a confidentiality agreement would protect the
employer's trade secrets and proprietary information, but not
employee's general knowledge or skills; the confidentiality
agreement could not reasonably be expected to safeguard
information concerning illegal acts. For example, the
confidentiality agreements Wigand allegedly breached were broad
ones, claimed by B&W to cover virtually everything Wigand knew
about B&W.523 Wigand disclosed that B&W knew that use of its
products presented substantial health risks and that Sandefur,
B&W's chief executive officer, had admitted privately that nicotine
is addictive.524 The B&W confidentiality agreements appear to have
been overly broad, safeguarding more than B &W trade secrets and
525proprietary information. Under basic contract principles, the
parties could not have reasonably expected the agreements to
prohibit disclosure of Sandefur's alleged perjury.
Disclosure could result in significant loss to the employer.
Losses might include lost profit due to loss of goodwill or to
withdrawal of a previously profitable product from the market.
Disclosure may lead to an increase in lawsuits against the employer,
increased legal fees for defending lawsuits, and an increased
number of monetary judgments against the employer. The legal
landscape for B&W has been completely transformed in the last
526few years. B&W, along with the other big tobacco companies,
has gone from being virtually judgment proof, to paying out
settlements in Mississippi, Florida, and Minnesota.52 '7 B&W faces
the real potential of a multi-state settlement and regulation by the
528
FDA. B&W is the defendant in a number of class action lawsuits.
One asbestos company, allegedly forced to pay for injury partially
523. See supra notes 400-01 and accompanying text.
524. See supra note 403.
525. See id.
526. See supra notes 13-27 and accompanying text.
527. See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
528. See Michael K. Frisby & Jeffrey Taylor, Tobacco-Deal Fees May Cause Fumes
on Capitol Hill, WALL ST.J., Sept. 5, 1997, at A14.
[Vol. 25
84
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 14
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol25/iss2/14
AT WHAT PRICE SILENCE
due to tobacco, has sued the tobacco industry for reimbursement;
other similar lawsuits seeking contribution from the tobacco
industry may follow.52 Presumably, the increase in B&W's legal
fees since Wigand's disclosures has been exponential.
The third element examines whether the information the
employee seeks to disclose is of the type generally protected as a
trade secret or as proprietary information. Wigand, because of his
position as a top B&W scientist, has information which certainly
concerns B&W trade secrets.530 Other information, such as the
addictiveness of cigarettes, was not the type of information
protectable as a trade secret and was public.
The fourth element analyzes whether nondisclosure would
result in serious danger to the health or safety of others or allow
illegal acts to go unpunished. How imminent and substantial is the
danger? It is better to avoid all potential health and safety
problems but some may not be obvious until health and safety have
already been impacted. For example, it was hard to predict the
danger prior to the Challenger explosion and prior to the first
Pinto crash. For Wigand and B&W, this is a gray area. The
tobacco industry foes claim that the link between tobacco and
cancer and other health problems is clear, additives to tobacco
products increased the risk, and the tobacco industry manipulated
nicotine levels to keep smokers addicted. 532 The tobacco industry
claims that there is no clear link between tobacco and health
problems, smokers choose to smoke, and smokers should have
individual responsibility for their actions. A confidentiality
agreement which fails to meet the public policy exception outlined
above because the effect on third parties is not "substantial" and
"adverse" could still be held unenforceable as unconscionable. M
529. See Milo Geyelin, Former Asbestos Makers May be New Headache for Tobacco
Firms, WALL ST.J., Oct. 1, 1997, at B4.
530. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Wigand, 913 F. Supp. 530, 530
(W.D. Ky. 1996).
531. See supra notes 403-06 and accompanying text.
532. See id.
533. See id.
534. See Quraishi, supra note 438, at 187-89. Quraishi compared western
common law and Islamic legal principles. See id. Then, he formulated a two-
prong test for determining whether a contract is unconscionable. See id. at 189.
Quraishi first noted the need for a workable test to determine if a contract is
unconscionable. See id. He then reviewed relevant common law and Islamic
principles before fashioning a two-prong test. See id. at 191-214. The first prong
of the test, unjust enrichment, borrows from Islamic law and the second, an
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The "exacerbation of adverse effects" element reviews whether
the information was already publicly available. A number of
sources claim that Wigand's disclosures significantly hastened the
increased liability of the tobacco industry, because of the quality of
the information revealed, the credibility of such a high former
tobacco official speaking, and the encouragement this gave to
others to disclose. On the other hand, much of the information
was already publicly available and increased liability of the tobacco
industry was inevitable, given the increasingly anti-tobacco mood in
536the country and the move toward political correctness.
A solution to the conflict between the employer's insistence on
enforcing a confidentiality agreement and the employee's desire to
make certain information public would be for the court to allow
limited disclosure of information impacting on public policy
without disclosing trade secrets or proprietary information. If
Wigand's disclosures had only been made in the context of
lawsuits, the court may have been able to fashion some remedy
allowing partial disclosure. Partial disclosure may have allowed
disclosure of vital information while protecting trade secrets. The
cases discussed in the "federal cases" section of Part II of this article
seem to say that the integrity of the judicial system requires
oppressive relationship, borrows from the common law. See id. at 189-90. The test
is as follows:
[T]his Comment proposes that courts should find a contract
unconscionable when both of two elements are satisfied: (1) one of the
contracting parties, through the contract, creates a potential for...
unjust enrichment... and (2) the beneficiary of the unearned profit
occupies the stronger position in an oppressive relationship between the
contracting parties. The first prong comes from the Islamic legal
principles of riba, while the second draws on the existing common law
unconscionability doctrine.
Id. at 215-16.
Under the proposed test, both prongs must be present for a contract to
be found unconscionable. See id. at 219. This makes sense because the presence
of either unjust enrichment or an oppressive relationship, without more, should
not be enough to invalidate a contract. See id. If the presence of one of the
prongs were enough, there could never be an enforceable contract between two
parties of vastly unequal bargaining power, such as a major manufacturer and a
consumer. See id. By the same token, there could never be an enforceable
contract resulting in a shrewd bargain for one of the parties, even if the parties
are both merchants of equal bargaining power.
535. See supra notes 6-9 and 371 and accompanying text.
536. See supra note 376 and accompanying text.
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communication of vital information, even in the face of a
confidentiality or settlement agreement.
The six elements of the test could be applied to Wigand's
allegations. Wigand, should have been allowed to disclose
information on Sandefur's alleged perjury. Disclosure is an easy
conclusion to reach because the parties could not have reasonably
expected the confidentiality agreements to protect information
concerning a criminal act; in addition, the information was not
protectable as a trade secret. Wigand's other disclosures were that
537
tobacco causes cancer and other health problems, that the
company used strategies to keep the informationprivate, that the
tobacco company manipulates nicotine levels, and that the
additives to the company's products present health dangers. 3 9 The
first two disclosures should have been allowed because the
information was not protectable as a trade secret; the first
disclosure also has a substantial adverse effect on third parties.
Whether the last two disclosures should be allowed is a more
difficult question because disclosure may result in the loss of trade
secrets and loss to the employer; however, the adverse effect on
third parties is substantial and non-disclosure would exacerbate the
adverse effect. Also, disclosure could be limited to avoid disclosure
of trade secrets.
V. CONCLUSION
In the employment relationship, the employee has a common
law duty to safeguard the employer's confidential information. A
growing number of employers wisely require employees to sign
confidentiality agreements; the agreements can define the
information the employer claims as confidential and can make the
employee aware of the duty of non-disclosure. Confidentiality
agreements are generally enforceable to protect the employer's
trade secrets and proprietary information. However, the duty of
non-disclosure is not absolute, especially if the employer is
attempting to prevent the employee from revealing illegality or
substantial adverse effects on third parties.
This article proposes a public policy exception to the
enforceability of confidentiality agreements. A court would
537. See supra notes 403-06.
538. See id.
539. See id.
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determine whether a challenged confidentiality agreement should
be enforced by applying the six-part test. The six-part test would
require a court to consider the parties' reasonable expectations,
the potential loss to the employer if the confidentiality agreement
is not enforced, the protectability of the information as a trade
secret or proprietary information, substantial adverse effects on
third parties, exacerbation of the adverse effects if the
confidentiality agreement is enforced, and the possibility of limited
disclosure.
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